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Information technology (IT) projects have a well-documented potential for 
complexity, difficulty, and failure. Typical explanations focus on project-related 
issues, but in some cases success or failure depends less on the project and 
more on the dynamic interaction of organizational factors at the portfolio level. 
This thesis focuses on the interplay of explicit and implicit organizational 
factors in complex organizations, and their effect on the outcome of IT projects. 
Through implicit organizational factors, a poorly executed, unhealthy project may 
infect healthy projects, similar to the spread of a contagion. This thesis utilizes a 
study of the United States Coast Guard WatchKeeper and Mission and Asset 
Scheduling Interface systems’ development as an example of the contagion 
effect. 
Analysis revealed three classes of implicit organizational factors that 
impacted project outcomes: capacity, control, and funding priorities. From an 
organizational perspective, implicit factors were found to play a much more 
significant role in affecting the outcome of projects than explicit factors. This is 
important because managers at various levels of hierarchy tend to focus only on 
explicit factors, often ignoring implicit factors. Several recommendations for 
improving project and portfolio management are presented based on this finding. 
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Investment in information technology (IT) programs has been identified as 
a critical area in the federal government. The federal IT Dashboard (2014) shows 
total fiscal year 2013 IT spending at nearly $76B for 28 agencies. In the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) alone, $5.6B was invested in 345 
projects, with $4.5B for 91 major projects. From huge enterprise resource 
planning (ERP) systems potentially catering to hundreds of thousands of users, 
to small research systems with hundreds of users, successful IT development is 
critical to the functioning of organizations. In general, much of the IT 
development expense in the federal government involves transitioning from 
legacy silo systems to enterprise spanning systems which facilitate sharing of 
data and integration of IT with business processes at all levels (Ross, Weill, & 
Robertson, 2006). The success rate of such endeavors is low. 
IT development is typically complex and difficult. In 1994 the Standish 
Group published the original chaos report which detailed only a 16 percent IT 
project success rate. While this rate has increased over the years, the potential 
for “other than successful results” remains uncomfortably high at 61 percent 
(Standish Group, 2013, p. 1). A recent example of IT project difficulty is the 
healthcare.gov website, which was intended to allow people to shop online for 
private health insurance. Although cost estimates vary wildly depending on the 
source, the contractor was awarded $93M (CGI Federal, 2011) to construct the 
site, which was essentially non-functional upon delivery. Due to the high profile 
nature of the failure, additional resources were immediately committed to rework 
the site. At this time an overall cost estimate is not available, but development 
obviously exceeded cost and schedule projections while delivering minimal 
functionality. 
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IT development and project management have been the subject of intense 
study for forty years, but consistent successful implementation remains elusive. 
This thesis focuses on the interplay of explicit and implicit organizational factors 
in complex organizations, and their effect on the outcome of IT projects. Through 
implicit organizational factors, a poorly executed, unhealthy project may infect 
healthy projects, similar to the spread of a contagion. This thesis utilizes a study 
of the United States Coast Guard WatchKeeper and Mission and Asset 
Scheduling Interface systems’ development as an example of the contagion 
effect. Extensive, in-depth data was available due to personal involvement in the 
projects by the author. 
Analysis revealed three classes of implicit organizational factors that 
impacted project outcomes: capacity, control, and funding priorities. From an 
organizational perspective, implicit factors were found to play a much more 
significant role in affecting the outcome of projects than explicit factors. This is 
important because managers at various levels of hierarchy tend to focus only on 
explicit factors, often ignoring implicit factors. Several recommendations for 
improving project and portfolio management are presented based on this finding. 
B. PROBLEM AND PURPOSE 
This thesis investigates how implicit and explicit organizational factors 
affect the success of IT projects within an enterprise portfolio and how contagion 
may be transmitted between projects. The U.S. government spends billions of 
dollars per year on IT programs which exceed schedule and budget constraints 
while delivering less than promised functionality and performance. Research 
exploring inter-portfolio effects may lead to better preparation, planning, and 
execution of IT projects, as well as reducing duplicative systems. Successful 
integration of enterprise IT systems and alignment with business processes is 
critical to overall mission success. 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 How can development of interdependent enterprise IT systems be 
affected by shifting portfolio funding priorities and clan control? 
 How are capacity issues recognized, and can they affect 
development of systems within an IT portfolio? 
 Can the interaction between explicit and implicit organizational 
control factors affect enterprise IT system development within a 
portfolio? 
D. BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS OF RESEARCH 
Enterprise system development is a complex and difficult area in which to 
succeed. Interoperable and networked systems continue to become more critical 
due to the amount of digitized data available for use. Development of new 
systems typically takes place in an IT environment comprised of various legacy 
systems, with varying degrees of peer connectivity. Creation of new systems 
invariably affects existing systems, or other systems in concurrent development. 
Investigation of organizational factors, their interdependencies, and contagion 
theory will provide useful insight to managers of IT development projects within 
enterprise portfolios as well as portfolio managers themselves. The study 
contributes evidence meaningful in capacity and control theory, as well as certain 
recommendations specific to the USCG. The thesis does not attempt to provide a 
simple, overt model which solves this incredibly complex problem. Indeed, the 
author’s point is that diligence and awareness at the portfolio level are critical in 
an attempt to minimize (or intelligently focus the effect of) implicit organizational 
factors. Direct applicability to all enterprise system development is not implied. 
E. IT PROJECT SUCCESS 
Overcoming the difficulties inherent in successful development of complex 
IT systems has become an industry. Much has been written about development 
methodologies, cost estimation, and project management. Given the high stakes 
which accompany financial commitments of this magnitude, varying definitions of 
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“success” have been created by the program manager trying to emphasize the 
positives in a challenged or essentially failed project. 
A commonly cited example in the Department of Defense (DOD) 
community is the United States Air Force’s (USAF) Expeditionary Combat 
Support System (ECSS). Upon cancellation in late 2012, the system had been in 
development for seven years at a cost of over $1B, with negligible capability. In 
addition, the USAF estimated another $1.1B would be required in order to 
achieve one quarter of the functionality originally promised, with system delivery 
in 2020 (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2013b; Reilly, 2012; USAF, 
2012b). Following cancellation, Congress and industry experts alike wondered 
how a failure of this magnitude had been allowed to happen, and why it had not 
been cancelled earlier. When Robert Shofner, the Air Force’s program executive 
officer for business and enterprise systems was asked this question, he called 
that “speculative” (Reilly, 2012, p. 3). The GAO investigated several “Major 
Automated Information Systems [MAIS]” in a 2013 report. Although many 
contributing causes were outlined for incomplete or failed systems, the focus 
during challenged, multi-year developments hinged on redefining “success” and 
lowering expectations. In the “impact” section of the USAF statement on ECSS 
cancelation, they focus on the “success” of other systems, rather than the ECSS 
failure: 
ECSS was one part of our overall logistics transformation effort. 
Expeditionary Logistics for the 21st Century (eLog21) was the 
overarching transformation campaign to fundamentally change the 
way logistics is accomplished Air Force wide. Since the eLog21 
campaign started in 2003, numerous logistics and supply chain 
initiatives have been successfully implemented to improve AF 
processes, policies, and technology.  To name a few examples, we 
leveraged Item Unique Identification marking process to cleanse 
1.4M records within the Air Force Equipment Management System 
to better support Asset Marking and Tracking. In addition, we 
developed standardized processes and tools for implementing 
proactive engineering concepts to improve Weapon System 
Sustainment. Finally, we developed and implemented the Aircraft 
Availability Improvement Program. The [US]AF has ongoing 
initiatives to continue to transform AF wide logistics planning, 
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resources and repair planning, data accuracy, centralized 
assessment management, and predictive maintenance. Despite the 
cancellation of ECSS, the AF remains committed and will continue 
to transform our logistics business processes. (USAF, 2012a, p. 1) 
The statement above nearly portrayed ECSS as an incidental and 
noncritical portion of a larger effort, despite representing a $1B waste of funds. 
Even the Navy ERP system, which is often hailed as a “success,” was 
delivered late, over budget, and with a functional subset much less than originally 
conceived. According to Perera:  
When measured against its original baseline, the lifecycle cost of 
Navy ERP has grown by about 31 percent as of September 2012, 
to $2.6 billion. It is also 2 years behind--auditors attribute slippages 
to system performance problems and the emergence of 
unanticipated requirements. The GAO also notes that as of 
December 2012, Navy officials reported that 560 system defects 
remained unresolved. (2013, p. 1) 
While the above facts could be interpreted as “other than successful,” the Navy 
and those in charge of program development frame the program as a “qualified 
success”: “Since 2006, ERP costs have stabilized and the program has been 
successfully implemented at three SYSCOMs [system commands]” (RAND, 
2012, p. 16). The Navy notes the ERP program promotes fiscal responsibility 
“while significantly reducing the cost of doing business” through standardization 
of business processes and common data sets (U.S. Navy [USN], 2014, p. 1). 
With such a wide and variable definition of “success” in IT project 
development, a common framework is helpful in attempting to categorize project 
results while removing the human desire to avoid acknowledging negative 
results. This thesis follows the widely utilized categories put forth by the Standish 
Group: 
 Resolution Type 1, or project success: The project is completed on-
time and on-budget, with all features and functions as initially 
specified. (1995, p. 2) 
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 Resolution Type 2, or project challenged: The project is completed 
and operational but over-budget, over the time estimate, and offers 
fewer features and functions than originally specified. (1995, p. 2) 
 Resolution Type 3, or project impaired: The project is cancelled at 
some point during the development cycle. (1995, p. 2) 
Although challenges to the Standish categories exist, and alternate 
definitions have been presented, the Standish definition is sufficient for the 
purposes of this thesis. Under this classification system, WK would be rated as 
resolution type two, while MASI could be argued as either type two or type three. 
F. METHODOLOGY PART I—OVERVIEW 
This qualitative study utilizes a grounded theory and case study approach. 
According to Cresswell, grounded theory is a process which “involves using 
multiple stages of data collection and the refinement and interrelationship of 
categories of information” (2009, p. 13). The case study involves the in-depth 
exploration of “a program, event, activity, process” and is “bounded by time and 
activity” (Cresswell, 2009, p. 13). Extensive detailed information was collected by 
a participant observer during the case time-frame to include hundreds of files, 
emails, and design documents. The participant’s placement within the case study 
program afforded unique personal insight and access to materials. An open 
coding scheme was utilized to generate information categories, and selective 
coding was used to explain the “story from the interconnection of these 
categories” (Cresswell, 2009, p. 184). Rather than beginning with a theory, 
hypotheses were allowed to emerge from the study (Oorschot, Akkermans, 
Sengupta, & Wassenhove, 2013). 
Validity is supported through the use of multiple strategies (Cresswell, 
2009). Triangulation involves utilizing “different data sources of information by 
examining evidence from the sources and using it to build coherent justification 
for themes” (Cresswell, 2009, p. 191). In this study, event analysis, analysis of 
archival data, and extensive data collected by the participant observer were 
utilized to enable triangulation. In addition to triangulation, a narrative description 
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was utilized to clarify complex sequences of events. The participant bias was 
clarified and the author was in the field with involved individuals during the 
majority of the program duration. As a final measure, member checking was 
utilized in critical areas. From the study and the analysis, and in line with the 
grounded theory approach, several themes emerged which are discussed in 
detail. 
The organizational structure of the thesis separates and simplifies the 
study and results. Chapter II explores relevant related academic theory and 
studies, forming a strong platform upon which to base the analysis. Chapter III 
presents CG specific background information which enables understanding of 
later narratives. The complex CG hierarchical and directorate structure is 
explained, as well as CG acquisition and IT development procedures. The final 
section of Chapter III details the analysis methodology and validity support. 
Chapter IV contains the case study analysis using the framework of Chapter II as 
a lens, and references the important detailed events described in Appendix A. 
Chapter V summarizes the results, provides insight into possible solutions, and 
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II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK (LITERATURE REVIEW) 
A. ENTERPRISE IT SYSTEMS PORTFOLIO 
1. Rationale for Enterprise IT 
Successful complex organizations rely heavily on enterprise systems to 
make them “better, faster, and more profitable at what they [do]” (Ross et al., 
2006, p. vii). Chen, Sun, Helms, and Jih note that managing an IT portfolio “can 
be conceptualized as an issue of aligning organizations with their IT to gain 
competitive advantages” (2008, p. 366; Reich & Benbasat, 2000). Gronau and 
Rohloff point out the “necessity of adjustment for information systems according 
to organizational environment” (2008, p. 1077) is critical because both business 
strategies and technology continually evolve (Luftman, 2003). When 
organizational goals or priorities change, the enterprise architecture vision and IT 
systems must align to the new processes, or disconnects occur between the 
operation of the organization and the critical support provided by the enterprise 
systems. If the IT systems are too difficult to change, organization processes 
may require modification to align to the systems. Ross et al., define enterprise 
architecture as “the organizing logic for business processes and IT infrastructure 
reflecting the integration and standardization requirements of the company’s 
operating model” (2006, p. 47). An organization’s operating model determines 
the key focus of IT initiatives, but the “key to effective enterprise architecture is to 
identify the processes, data, technologies, and customer interfaces” (Ross et al., 
2006, p. 47).  
Enterprise architecture is a broad area, and several books have been 
written on the topic. The discussion here does not address enterprise 
architecture and how to implement it, but rather a common side effect of an initial 
lack of enterprise thinking when developing IT solutions. The lack of enterprise 
thinking and resulting IT systems eventually limit business agility and growth. 
Many businesses and agencies fell into this trap organically, including the USCG, 
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which will be used as an example. The trap is the creation of IT silos, or isolated 
IT solutions within an organization. An IT silo refers to a system designed to meet 
a specific local business need. The problem occurs when the business later 
realizes their execution is limited by the lack of system interoperability. Ross et 
al. describe the situation: “Individually, the applications work fine. Together, they 
hinder companies’ efforts to coordinate…and the company’s data, one of its most 
important assets, is patchy, error-prone, and not up to date” (2006, p. 6–7). 
The USCG traces its roots to the Revenue Cutter Service, formed in 1790. 
In 1915, the United States Life-Saving Service merged with the Revenue Cutter 
Service to create the Coast Guard. In 1939, the United States Lighthouse 
Service also merged with the USCG as well as the Bureau of Marine Inspection 
and Navigation in 1942. At various points during its history, the CG has been 
placed under the Department of the Treasury (1790), the Department of 
Transportation (DOT) (1967), and in 2003 was placed under the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) (USCG Historian’s Office, n.d.). Even with paper 
records and methods prior to the computer era, the CG was a mix of merged 
entities under several different agencies. Business processes were created and 
optimized at local levels, or within individual business units. During its tenure 
under the DOT, information systems became prevalent as well as networks and 
the World Wide Web. Certainly the switch to management under DHS took place 
when the CG had numerous IT systems in place. Is it any wonder IT systems 
were created which are unable to communicate with each other or share data? 
In complicated environments with many siloed systems, direct database to 
database and direct system connections are often created one at a time, for valid 
reasons, until they are unmanageable as a group. This undesirable method leads 
to a web of interconnections where a change to a single system can force 
changes to all connected systems, or result in system failure when an 
interconnection goes unnoticed. Eventually, management of the tangled systems 
is no longer practical. Many businesses have found themselves considering 
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overarching enterprise architecture after realizing their legacy systems are 
inadequate and unsustainable in view of current business demands.  
2. Interconnection of Enterprise Systems 
Enterprise IT systems often share, access, or modify the same data. 
Certain enterprise systems may be considered the “system of record,” or the 
“authority” for specific data, which is then shared with other systems. According 
to Marechaux, “Today's business applications rarely live in isolation. They need 
to be connected in order to create an integrated solution from which an 
organization can derive value” (2006, p. 1). 
A popular method for facilitating data sharing and interaction of enterprise 
systems is use of an enterprise service bus (ESB) which combines the virtues of 
service-oriented architecture (SOA) and event-driven architecture (EDA). SOA 
has become widely advocated as an enabler of business agility and as a tool to 
increase alignment of business goals and IT (Bieberstein, Bose, Fiammante, 
Jones & Shah, 2006; Chen, Kazman, & Perry, 2010; Choi, Nazareth, & Hemant, 
2013). As previously mentioned, many organizations have legacy information 
system silos. Enterprise IT architecture favors process driven enterprise tools 
over function driven silos. SOA supports this method, as shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.  Silo versus SOA (from Marechaux, 2006) 
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EDA complements SOA. While SOA operates using a request/reply 
mechanism, EDA utilizes an asynchronous publish/subscribe method. By 
combining the two concepts the ESB allows for a wide range of communications 
between systems. SOA enables one-to-one connections, while EDA allows one-
to-many or many-to-many publications. Applications within the portfolio publish 
services which other applications consume. Some systems accept write-backs 
from other systems or users. According to Marechaux, 
SOA is an architectural concept in which all functions, or services, 
are defined using a description language and where their interfaces 
are discoverable over a network. The interface is defined in a 
neutral manner that is independent of the hardware platform, the 
operating system, and the programming language in which the 
service is implemented. (2006, p. 1) 
The technology independent service provided by one system may be 
subscribed to by any other system with the authority to do so. The same service 
may be consumed by multiple enterprise systems. The technology independent 
service, referred to as “loosely coupled,” eliminates the need for a direct 
connection to every system sharing data. Alterations may be made to the 
underlying system without affecting the published service. In this manner, 
changes to the system of record are transparent to systems consuming the data. 
The USCG utilizes the ESB exclusively for all new connections between IT 
systems. As legacy systems are updated, direct system interconnections are 
eliminated in favor of ESB topics. 
B. ENTERPRISE SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT WITHIN PORTFOLIOS 
1. Overview 
The Project Management Institute (PMI) discusses the relationship 
between projects, programs, and portfolios: 
A portfolio refers to a collection of projects or programs and other 




that work to meet strategic business objectives. The projects or 
programs of the portfolio may not necessarily be interdependent or 
directly related. (PMI, 2008, p. 8) 
A program is “a group of related projects managed in a coordinated way to 
obtain benefits and control not available from managing them individually” (PMI, 
2008, p. 9). Thus a portfolio encompasses programs which encompass projects, 
placing projects at the lowest level of this hierarchy. Not all projects are a 
member of a program, but all programs have subordinate projects. Management 
at the portfolio level is concerned with attaining strategic business goals, aligning 
efforts with organizational strategies, and proper resource allocation. Critical to 
the program definition is the requirement that member projects are “related 
through [a] common outcome or collective capability. If the relationship between 
projects is only that of a shared client, seller, technology, or resource, the effort 
should be managed as a portfolio of projects rather than as a program” (PMI, 
2008, p.10). Unfortunately, in practice this clear hierarchy and line of authority 
from portfolio to project is not always present. 
2. Resource Concerns 
Central to the idea of enterprise architecture and IT is a well thought out 
high level view of a business and its needs. In avoiding or eliminating IT silos in 
favor of process oriented enterprise solutions, the overall IT portfolio must be 
considered. Even if enterprise systems within the IT portfolio of a business do not 
logically interact, they affect one another by their funding and resource 
requirements. In order to complete a major upgrade of one system, a different 
system may be required to subsist for the year on minimal funding and support. 
Gronau and Rohloff explain, “From the position of the value within the portfolio, 
recommendations for future arrangement of the IT strategy are derived” (2008, 
p.1077). No enterprise system exists in a vacuum and the portfolio view must be 
managed to prevent duplication of effort and ensure responsible expenditure of 
funds, as well as an overall balance of systems. 
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3. Interdependent System Development Complexities 
In addition to resource concerns, enterprise system interactions must be 
considered at the portfolio level, preferably during system design and 
requirements gathering phases. By avoiding duplication of effort, the likelihood 
systems will share data, or operate on common data, is increased.  
For systems under concurrent development, difficulties are encountered 
when attempting to coordinate development schedules between separate 
enterprise systems. No master schedule encompassing the projects exists 
because the projects are otherwise independent. Although the goal is to loosely 
couple systems via constructs such as the ESB, systems must articulate their 
data requirements to one another. If these requirements have been recognized at 
the portfolio level during the early stages of design, the effort can easily be 
scoped into the respective project plans. If the need is recognized in later stages, 
creation of unplanned ESB topics can force schedule slippage. In large 
organizations, a change review board, or other authority, must authorize changes 
to a project’s functionality and schedule. Often, these enterprise systems have 
separate review boards with differing priorities. It can be challenging to compel 
another program’s board to consider the needs of your program. Furthermore, for 
unplanned work, the other system may require you to supply funding for the 
effort. Practically speaking, schedules rarely align, requiring effort by 
management at organizational levels above those of the projects themselves. 
Organizational factors will then determine work priority. 
C. DEVELOPMENT OF COMPLEX SOFTWARE SYSTEMS 
1. Overview 
Design and development of complex software systems involves actors at 
all levels of an organization. General discussion in this thesis is limited to 
enterprise systems development within large organizations, where stakeholders 
may or may not be internal to the organization, but they are distinct from the 
business entities responsible for project development. Furthermore, the focus of 
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discussion is the portfolio, program, or organizational view, rather than the 
project as an independent entity. Envisioning the portfolio in which a project is 
developed as a series of concentric rings is helpful in illustrating variables 
influencing single project development (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2.  Managing Complex Software Projects: Single Project View 
The project is affected by project manager decisions, its own 
characteristics, and organizational factors (Oorschot et al., 2013). Of specific 
interest is the interaction of the organizational realities ring with the other 
variables, and how the development and performance of other enterprise 
systems within the portfolio can affect other projects. Figure 3 illustrates how 
multiple projects often interact with each other, all affected by organizational 
realities. Large organizations may have hundreds of projects within an enterprise 
portfolio. A high level overview of each ring is provided in order to create a 
framework for analyzing interaction between variables. 
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Figure 3.  Managing Complex Software Projects: Portfolio View 
2. Project Manager Decision Space 
Although other factors also affect the success or failure of IT projects, 
Verner, Sampson, and Cerpa (2008), and Nelson (2007) agree project 
management plays a critical role. Nelson states, “After studying the infamous 
failures…it becomes apparent that failure is seldom a result of chance. Instead, it 
is rooted in one, or a series of, misstep(s) by project managers” (2007, p. 67). 
The role of the project manager is well defined in the project management 
body of knowledge (PMBOK) as established by the PMI. A project manager has 
responsibilities to both the internal team and external organization (Satzinger, 
Jackson, & Bird, 2009). 
3. Project Characteristics 
Characteristics of the project itself are straightforward, though not always 
correctly identified early in the design process. As defined by the PMI, a “project 
is a temporary endeavor undertaken to create a unique product, service, or 
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result” (2008, p. 5). In the enterprise information systems context, projects 
typically require hardware, software, and network infrastructure. Depending on 
complexity, project duration may range from several weeks to several years, 
costing from thousands to billions of dollars. The magnitude and complexity of a 
proposed system also impacts time required for development. The goals or 
expected functionality of the information system are represented here. A 
common construct describes the relation of project characteristics with other 
factors. The construct, with small variation, is referred to as the Golden Triangle 
(Gardiner & Stewart, 2000), the Iron Triangle (Atkinson, Crawford, & Ward, 2006) 
or the Triple Constraint (Schwalbe, 2006) and one representation is shown in 
Figure 4. In this representation, quality is implied by the interaction of the three 
sides of the triangle. In other representations, quality may be placed on a side, 
with cost in the middle. Time and cost are self-explanatory, and scope refers to 
the desired functionality of the system. Although this representation is very 
simplistic, it reinforces the idea that only two of the three sides may be altered at 
any one time, with the impact of alterations shown in the third side. If schedule 
time and cost are reduced, the scope of the project must decrease. If increased 
scope is desired while holding schedule time constant, cost will increase (due to 
expanding the development team, etc.). It should be noted that although 
alterations to one side or another may be desired, the alteration may not be 
possible for the organization to implement due to capacity constraints. 
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Figure 4.  Project Management Triangle (from Tutorialspoint, n.d.)  
4. Organizational Realities (Factors) 
Organizational factors permeate and influence every project as well as the 
higher portfolio. Ross notes, “The policies and technical choices for developing IT 
capabilities must reflect organizational realities and thus inevitably require 
tradeoffs” (2003, p. 3). True alignment of business and IT objectives is difficult to 
achieve, as indicated by Sjøberg, Odberg, and Warlo: 
Large private enterprises and government agencies generally have 
a comprehensive portfolio of interdependent information systems. A 
major challenge faced by these organizations is how to control the 
increasing complexity and the associated costs of such systems as 
the portfolio evolves. Typically, the number and size of the systems 
and the components of the individual systems increases over time, 
as well as the number of relationships between these systems and 
components. The continuous change in the nature of the business 
and often the increased complexity of the domain lead to more 
complex system requirements and information models, and the 
increased functionality of the systems. (2010, p. 71) 
Even when business and IT objectives finally align, the business itself changes, 
or the information systems require increased functionality or replacement of 
outdated technology standards with current ones in order to maintain 
compatibility with other networked systems. As mentioned in the “Rationale for 
Enterprise IT,” and supported by Ross, “The objective is to get to the point where  
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IT capabilities shape business strategy while business strategy shapes IT 
capabilities in response to changing market conditions and organizational 
realities” (2003, p. 3). 
D. TYING IT ALL TOGETHER: ORGANIZATIONAL FACTOR 
INTERDEPENDENCIES 
1. Overview 
As introduced above, organizational factors are dynamic and shape the 
environment within which IT portfolio development takes place. This concept will 
be thoroughly explored because it is central to understanding the effect programs 
and projects may have upon one another within a portfolio. Organizational factors 
can be described as either explicit or implicit (Oorschot et al., 2013). 
2. Explicit Factors 
Explicit organizational factors are typically directly stated in a formal 
business plan, goal, or vision statement. They are also stated in official policies, 
standard operating procedures, and guidelines. IT system projects based on 
explicit organizational factors may be in response to the competitive advantage 
of another company, or created in an effort to gain competitive advantage. Legal 
and government regulations and budgetary constraints are explicit factors. 
Explicit measurements for IT systems include net present value, internal rate of 
return, and economic value added. If systems are expected to generate profits, 
explicit factors may include marketing, sales, and profitability factors. In other 
cases, the system may indirectly support the business, such as human resources 
systems, customer databases, and ecommerce systems. The ecommerce 
system, for example, does not increase sales directly, but enables sales over the 
internet in order to broaden the company’s potential customer base. 
According to PMI, “Organizational structure is an enterprise environmental 
factor which can affect the availability of resources and influence how projects 
are conducted. Organizational structures range from functional to projectized, 
with a variety of matrix structures between them” (2008, p. 28). Organizational 
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structure delineates explicit lines of authority for programs and projects. A 
functional organization is the traditional hierarchical representation where 
employees have one superior, and departments are organized by function under 
a functional manager or vice president. Examples of functional departments are 
human resources, production, engineering, etc. Departments typically work 
independently of each other. In a matrixed structure, an employee will often 
report to both a functional manager and a project manager. The employee is 
assigned to work on a project but is still “owned” by the functional manager. If a 
project has no work for the employee on a given day the functional manager can 
reassign them as needed. A truly project-oriented structure grants the project 
manager a great deal of authority, but can be inefficient. In this model, the project 
manager has a diverse staff assigned to them for the duration of the project. The 
project funds the staff, regardless of whether there is immediate work to be done 
by a particular member (Schwalbe, 2006). Table 1 summarizes the project 
characteristics associated with the different organization structures. 
 
Table 1.   Organizational Influences on Projects (from PMI, 
2008, p. 28) 
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3. Implicit Factors 
As addressed here, implicit means “implied, rather than expressly stated” 
(dictionary.com, n.d.). Due to their nature, implicit factors may not be apparent, 
depend on individual interpretation, and can be dynamic. Prior literature has 
demonstrated that implicit factors can have a significant effect on the 
implementation and success of IT projects. A synthesis of the literature on 
information systems project management, and management of research and 




 Funding Priorities 
The three implicit factor areas are explored in-depth in the following sections. 
a. Capacity 
Capacity refers to the ability of an organization to complete work. At full 
capacity an organization has exactly the appropriate personnel and resources 
available to perform all work, according to the various program and project 
schedules. In reality, the operation of a large organization is too dynamic to attain 
or maintain full capacity in this sense. Chuan and Raghavan state, “Conflicting 
resource constraints between departments translate into business risk” (2004, pp 
21). Capacity and funding priorities are similar in that they truly become the 
object of scrutiny when there are insufficient resources to complete all work. If 
too much work has been accepted, or capacity has been reduced due to 
turnover, reduction (or lack) of funds, or other loss of resources, the programs 
and projects within a portfolio will be prioritized. 
Capacity can be visible, or hidden. An example of visible capacity is seen 
in the airline industry. The airline knows the explicit capacity of an airplane, and 
chooses to overbook the flight. They know how many people check in for the 
flight, and before boarding takes place, they know if the plane has exceeded 
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capacity. In this event, they offer incentives to reduce the number of passengers 
to that which the plane can carry. The industry has determined this approach to 
be the most cost effective in the long run, and the process is deliberate. 
Unfortunately, businesses with large IT portfolios engaging in complex system 
development have no such method to gauge excess capacity. It is hidden in the 
sense that it cannot be objectively determined at an arbitrarily chosen point in 
time. In system development, the concept of exceeding capacity is associated 
with elongating schedules, increasing cost, and personnel issues. As Sjøberg et 
al., note, “The greater complexity of the software portfolio leads to a higher cost 
of developing new systems and maintaining existing ones, a reduced business 
agility, a longer time-to-market, and an increased dependence on highly skilled 
people” (2010, p. 71). 
Adding to the uncertainty of the capacity issue is the desire of many 
organizations to optimize operations through the elimination of organizational 
slack. Bourgeois defined organizational slack as  
…that cushion of actual or potential resources which allows an 
organization to adapt successfully to internal pressures for 
adjustment or to external pressures for change in policy as well as 
to initiate changes in strategy with respect to the external 
environment. (1981, p. 30) 
Bourgeois argued that although cutting apparent organizational slack could 
achieve short-term efficiency, it was detrimental over time (1981). Keegan and 
Turner present the opposing view: “Opponents of slack claim that it promotes 
undisciplined investment in new developments and new products and services 
that show poor potential to generate economic benefits” (2002, p. 369). As 
mentioned, however, in the context of complex IT portfolio development and 
management, excess capacity is dynamic and difficult to quantify. From a 
personnel perspective, in a project-based firm it is not practical to lay off skilled 
developers following project completion, expecting they will return to the 
company for the next project. In a matrix based organization, one project may 
reserve a specialist who is reassigned to a higher priority project at the last 
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moment, jeopardizing the schedule of the original project. For a company 
attempting slack minimization, Goncalves, Mendes, and Resende note “the 
allocation of scarce resources then becomes a major objective of the problem 
and several compromises have to be made to solve the problem to the desired 
level of near-optimality” (2004, p. 1171). Put another way, projects in the portfolio 
may suffer due to excessive focus on slack minimization. 
A common capacity problem often seen in businesses which have 
minimized organizational slack is firefighting. In the IT portfolio context, the more 
complex a system development project is, the more likely it will experience 
unforeseen problems (Sjøberg et al., 2010). A “fire” results when a project 
experiences such a problem, requiring assistance from resources external to the 
team. In the “optimized” organization, external resources must be pulled from 
other teams, thereby putting their project schedules at risk. This, in turn, may 
cause a “fire” in that project, and the process propagates. Programs of sufficient 
size may experience local firefighting within the program, as one sub-team 
cannibalizes another. The immediate effects of firefighting are many:  
Firefighting imposes numerous costs…Introduction dates are often 
slipped, reducing the chance of market success; engineers and 
managers sometimes work extraordinary hours, leading to fatigue, 
burnout, turnover, and increasing the chance of further errors; and 
additional people are often added to the project, thus requiring 
additional expense. (Repenning, 2001, p. 286) 
From the portfolio management perspective, firefighting is a self-propagating 
cycle (Bohn & Jaikumar, 2000; Repenning, 2001).  
Bohn and Jaikumar feel firefighting is best described as a syndrome, 
comprised of the following linked elements (2000, p. 4): 
 Too many problems, not enough time to solve them all. 
 Incomplete solutions 
 Recurring and cascading problems 
 Urgency supersedes importance 
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 Preemption of one problem solving effort by another 
 Performance drop 
Concerning the elements, they note: “We consider any organization that 
exhibits three or more of these elements to be doing firefighting, and if they are 
chronic it has the firefighting syndrome” (Bohn & Jaikumar, 2000, p. 5). In such 
an environment, a fundamentally troubled project may be misinterpreted as 
simply having capacity issues. An otherwise healthy project may be perceived as 
problematic due to the symptoms of firefighting without an understanding of the 
true cause. They describe the self-propagating nature of the syndrome:  
…there is a significantly worse situation that applies to many 
organizations, especially those where problem solving is inherently 
difficult. In these cases, the pressure of a backlog of unsolved 
problems leads engineers to solve problems not just inefficiently, 
but badly. As a result, each problem supposedly solved has a 
chance of creating a new problem, and sometimes more than one. 
(Bohn & Jaikumar, 2000, p. 16) 
When this happens, projects become more susceptible to contagion from other 
programs within the portfolio. 
b. Control 
In complex organizations, control may be wielded by individuals or groups 
at varying levels of hierarchy. At higher levels, controllers influence IT 
architecture, organizational goals and portfolio strategy. At the middle level, 
controllers influence project development schedules, distribution of project funds, 
and prioritization. Lower levels control system quality and implementation. 
Controllers may or may not be explicitly designated and may have individual 
interests in certain programs or projects. Implicit control brokers may be informal 
advisors to explicit decision makers, or may have influence for a variety of 




Much of the research in organizational control theory is based on the work 
of Ouchi and extended by others, prominently Laurie Kirsch and various 
collaborators. Rustagi, King, and Kirsch elaborate on the difference between 
formal and informal control: 
Scholars investigating control often make a distinction between 
formal and informal controls, noting that mechanisms used to 
exercise formal control are documented, while mechanisms of 
informal control are generally implicit (Kirsch 2004). Thus, written 
project plans, testing procedures, and job descriptions are 
mechanisms of formal control, whereas peer pressure, influence, 
and social events constitute informal control mechanisms. (2008, 
pp. 128) 
Two prominent modes of formal control are behavior and outcome 
(Eisenhardt, 1985; Kirsch, Sambamurthy, Ko, & Purvis, 2002; Kirsch, 2004; 
Ouchi, 1979, 1980). Behavioral control involves following appropriate rules and 
procedures in performing pre-specified tasks. Performance is evaluated based 
on the extent to which the procedures were adhered to (Boss, S., Kirsch, 
Angermeier, Shingler, & Boss, R., 2009; Kirsch et al., 2002). Outcome control 
shifts emphasis to achievement of a stated goal, regardless of the process 
followed to achieve it. Successful performance is related to the extent the goals 
were met (Boss et al. 2009; Kirsch et al. 2002; Rustagi et al., 2008). Formal 
control is often explicitly exercised according to the organizational structure of a 
business. In a functional organization, a manager exerts control on an employee. 
In a matrixed organization, an employee’s manager, or project manager exert 
control. In the project-oriented organization the project manager exerts the 
majority of formal control on team members. In all cases varying amounts of 
formal control are exercised in the hierarchy, or in the armed forces by the chain 
of command. 
The method of informal control relevant to this study is clan control. A clan 
was defined by Ouchi “as a group of individuals who are dependent on each 
other, and who display a great deal of goal congruence, shared values, and 
norms, discipline toward their work, and ‘solidarity’ and ‘regularity’ in their 
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relations with each other” (Kirsch, Ko, & Haney, 2010, p. 470). Clan control, then, 
is the theory that a clan exercises control over its members via socially accepted 
behavior within the clan norms (Kirsch et al., 2010). Kirsch et al., also note “The 
mere existence of shared norms, values, vision, or agreed-upon behaviors does 
not indicate clan control; however, when actual behavior is influenced by those 
shared norms, values, vision, or agreed-upon behaviors, clan control is 
operating” (2010, pp 471). An interesting question may be asked when 
investigating implicit control within an organization: Which clan is an individual 
conforming to when behaving in a certain way? Is the clan the team, the 
department, or some other group an individual may consider themselves a part 
of? Rutner examines the emotional dissonance felt by IT professionals who are 
regularly expected to interface with both IT colleagues and workers in other 
functional areas who often display different occupational norms (2008). This 
dissonance is amplified in DOD and other government agencies where civilian 
contractors often work with members of the uniformed services. To which norms 
(clan) would an individual conform? 
Further distinction in clan control focuses on input mechanisms and 
targets (Cardinal, 2001; Cardinal, Sitkin, & Long, 2004) as well as the role of clan 
control and behavior. According to Kirsch et al., the latter area investigates “the 
role of shared norms, values, and vision in guiding and influencing behaviors. 
Researchers who adopt this latter perspective tend to focus on the role of clan 
control in motivating specific behaviors of individuals in existing work groups” 
(2010, p. 471). Determining an individual’s perceived clan affiliation is beneficial 
in determining the motivation behind an action. A seemingly nonsensical action 
may make sense when viewed in the appropriate clan context, which may not be 
obvious. 
Different combinations of formal and informal control have been observed 
operating individually, or in conjunction, in different organizations. Cardinal, 
(2001), Cardinal et al. (2004) and Kirsch (1997, 2004) argue clan control can 
complement formal control, and they document informal control use in formal 
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business settings. “In the context of teams, it is possible to observe both lateral 
(peer to peer) control and hierarchical (manager to subordinate) control” (Kirsch 
et al., 2010, p. 471). Finally, Kirsch et al. (2010) argue control types may change 
during IT projects due to the evolving relationship between controller and 
controlee. Choudhury and Sabherwal (2003) concur, observing outcome controls 
dominate the initial phases of a project, with behavioral controls added later. 
c. Funding Priorities 
Funding priorities are often not directly stated (or known) until necessary. 
Although a portfolio is seldom fully funded, when this occurs there is little need to 
discuss which programs or projects are more important than others. In reality, 
budgets are often allocated yearly while projects may span multiple years. During 
long term development, discovery of new requirements or unforeseen difficulties 
can cause projects to overrun initial projections, which in turn causes a shortage 
of funds at the portfolio level (Oorschot et al., 2013). When this occurs in an 
already leanly funded portfolio, priority becomes critical. Indeed, this discussion 
is often contentious and confrontational when decided by committee rather than 
a single individual. 
Prioritization in large organizations is problematic. Chun and Rainey 
(2005) address the issue in reference to US federal agencies: 
Priority goal ambiguity refers to the level of interpretive leeway in 
deciding on priorities among multiple goals. To indicate priorities 
means to make decisions about which goals should take 
precedence over others at a given time, or to form a goal hierarchy 
in which the goals are vertically arranged through means-ends 
relationships (Richards 1986). The presence of multiple goals 
without any hierarchical arrangement and prioritization leaves much 
room for interpretation of such priorities and about which goals take 
precedence. (p. 4) 
 Although Chun and Rainey use priority goal ambiguity as an empirical measure, 
the idea illustrates that priority determination becomes more complex as more 
goals or projects are considered. The statement on the consequence of the 
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absence of prioritization is critical. With too much room for interpretation of 
priority, personal preference, incompetence, and other informal or social 
concerns may become the basis for goal ranking, rather than importance to the 
overall organization. 
A large organization may have hundreds of smaller systems within the IT 
portfolio. As Jung notes, partially based on the work of Chun and Rainey, 
organization size and complexity compounds priority ambiguity issues and can 
increase the number of goal conflicts: 
When public organizations have more goals, it will be more difficult 
to clearly set priorities among them, and thereby some type of 
organizational goal ambiguity (e.g., priority ambiguity) will be 
increased (Chun and Rainey 2005a). In addition, the presence of 
more goals can bring more occurrences of goal conflict. In other 
words, in public agencies with multiple goals, the achievement of 
some goals can be complicated or hindered by the achievement of 
other goals. (2013, p. 5) 
An explicit method of clear prioritization would be ideal. Bardhan, Bagchi, 
and Sougstad proposed a portfolio valuation and ranking system based on real 
options, although they acknowledge “complexities of IT projects along with the 
effect of project interdependencies raise several challenges in applying real 
options for prioritization of IT investments” (2004, p. 33). Several other articles 
propose alternate models, including the “balanced scorecard” (Hu & Huang, 
2006, p. 5), applications of the “dynamic capabilities perspective” (Chen et al., 
2008, p. 366), and the “IT/Business Alignment Maturity” model (Luftman, 2003, p. 
9). All proponents acknowledge the complex challenge involved, and emphasize 
business and IT alignment is a journey, not a state (Hu & Huang, 2006). 
Bardhan, Kauffman, and Naranpanawe further reinforce the idea of goal 
conflict and the challenge of prioritization:  
IT budgets of many large corporations consist of several hundreds 
of IT projects and not just a handful. They all are simultaneously 
vying for funding approval. As a result, it is a significant challenge 
to identify and select those projects that are properly aligned with  
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the firm’s business strategy going into the future and then to 
implement them in a proper sequence in order to yield the maximal 
value for the organization. (2010, p. 2:2) 
Not only is prioritization complex, project managers have a vested interest 
in seeing their project funded, and present compelling value arguments. With 
potentially hundreds of worthy IT projects to prioritize, how do decision makers 
determine which ones best align with business objectives? Substantial research 
has been performed regarding business and IT alignment from a portfolio view. 
Hu and Huang explain “Studies show that the lack of alignment between IT and 
business strategies is one of the main reasons why firms fail to realize the full 
potential of their IT investments” (2006, p. 3). Alignment of business and IT goals 
helps decision makers not only prioritize projects, but provides motivation to 
better support them. “IS development projects may take too much time, or even 
fail, if [senior management] commitment is erratic” (Newman & Sabherwal, 1996, 
p. 24) and “commitment is clearly important to the success of IS development 
projects” (Newman & Sabherwal, 1996, p. 23). Not only should decision makers 
establish clear funding priorities, they should communicate the priorities, in 
conjunction with the business strategies, to all levels of the organization. 
d. Interdependencies of Implicit and Explicit Factors 
Implicit and explicit factors are highly interdependent and interact both 
laterally between departments and organizations, and vertically, throughout an 
organization’s hierarchy (which is itself also an explicit factor). As explicit vertical 
hierarchy increases, so does the potential for implicit factor influence. A classic 
example is telling the first person in a long line a simple fact and having them 
relay it to the next person, repeating this process until the end of the line. When 
the last person relays what they were told, there is a good chance it has changed 
from the original message. In the case of explicit organizational hierarchy, the 
desire to please your superior is an additional factor. Implicit control and capacity 
concerns may enter at any level. Lateral interaction includes firefighting 
syndrome, as well as concerns regarding clan control between groups. Sinha 
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and Van de Ven (2005) conceptualize work between and within organizations as 
shown in Figure 5 and this also serves as an excellent framework for this study. 
While the authors focus on work, the graphic and concepts apply extremely well 
in illustrating program and project complexity and the effect of organizational 
factors, both within an organization’s IT portfolio, and across departments and 
related organizations. 
 
Figure 5.  Conceptualizing Work Design Problems (from Sinha, & Van de 
Ven, 2005, p. 390) 
In Figure 5, the vertical axis refers to work within an organizational 
hierarchy. Sinha and Van de Ven state “The resources, knowledge, and authority 
of a work system may be contained within one level of an organization, or it may 
be divided among many hierarchical levels” (2005, p. 390). In complex IT 
portfolios, explicit organizational factors typically operate vertically, influenced by 
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implicit factors. Resources are assigned in the form of funding, authority is 
assigned and derived from regulations, plans, and goals, and organizational 
knowledge is passed down. The horizontal axis illustrates how “the work system 
may be distributed across many organizational units of one or many firms, where 
each provides a component or module for an interorganizational network” (Sinha 
& Van de Ven, 2005, p. 390). In the language of IT portfolios, projects which are 
members of programs are often developed concurrently across lateral 
departments, or by similar departments in different organizations. Concurrent 
development is enabled by many object-oriented methodologies. Object 
definition and division of work can be difficult. Movement along the diagonal of 
Figure 5 represents the space where alignment of business goals and IT should 
take place. Organizational factors permeate the entire space. 
Sinha and Van de Ven articulate three problems in the figure, which also 
apply to IT portfolio development. The modularity problem addresses the 
difficulty of dividing work between lateral departments or organizational units. At 
what point might outsourcing or subcontracting be considered when undertaking 
large program development? Where are the logical program divisions which 
would allow concurrent development among diverse entities? The hierarchical 
problem involves vertical division of responsibilities and authority. Often a 
program manager is at a higher hierarchical level than the project manager. The 
network problem is the most complex and the most problematic, created by the 
interaction of the previous two problems. Sinha and Van de Ven describe the 
network problem:  
When combining the two dimensions shown in Figure [5], we have 
a hierarchically differentiated work system consisting of 
interdependent modules that are performed by different 
organizational units in the work system network. The complex 
network problem represents the interaction effects of the modularity 
and hierarchy problems just discussed on coordinating work within 
and between organizations. (2005, p. 394) 
In this context, the interaction possibilities of organizational factors on the IT 
portfolio are evident. It is also here where contagion may enter. 
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E. THE CONTAGION EFFECT 
Research regarding the contagion effect is well established in financial 
literature, although not directly found in IT portfolio management literature. The 
firefighting syndrome as described by Bohn and Jaikumar can precede contagion 
(2000) and contribute to its propagation. The author proposes a contagion effect 
can spread from one problematic program or project within a portfolio to disrupt 
otherwise healthy projects, and supports this with a case study of two enterprise 
USCG IT systems. Parallels can be drawn between the spread of contagion in 
financial systems and the effect interconnected enterprise systems may cause 
via the complex network problem presented above, propagated by organizational 
factors. 
One theory is that small shocks, which initially affect only a few 
institutions or a particular region of the economy, spread by 
contagion to the rest of the financial sector and then infect the 
larger economy…When one region suffers a bank crisis, the other 
regions suffer a loss because their claims on the troubled region fall 
in value. If this spillover effect is strong enough, it can cause a 
crisis in the adjacent regions. In extreme cases, the crisis passes 
from region to region and becomes a contagion. (Allen & Gale, 
2000, p. 2) 
The analogous situation in an IT portfolio refers to either a program with 
interconnected projects, or simply interconnected projects, whether the 
interconnections are physical, operational, or implicit. The projects could be 
developed within one organization, or several. Perturbation to an aspect of the 
program can cause similar perturbations to the subordinate or connected 
projects. For example, a capability shortage to one project could affect 
completion of a component which the subordinate project requires in order to 
perform development. The schedule of the subordinate project is affected 
because it is unable to begin development in a timely manner. In another 
example, functionality in the parent program could be curtailed due to funding 
priorities, affecting schedule and functionality in interconnected programs. A 
series of such shocks to the program could eventually become a contagion from 
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which the subordinate programs cannot recover. As noted by Sinha and Van de 
Ven, (2005) when the number of organizations and levels of hierarchy increase, 
so does the complexity of the problem, and in the IT context, the magnitude and 
breadth of the impact of the contagion. 
Another dissimilar yet complex operation from which parallels can be 
drawn is the area of mergers and acquisitions. Shaver described a negative side 
effect of mergers, which can also apply to interconnected IT systems: 
First, integration of the two businesses, in a way to effectively 
capture synergies, makes them more interdependent. Therefore, 
negative shocks to one of the businesses, stemming from changes 
in the environment or actions by competitors, are more likely to 
have an impact across businesses of the integrated firm, compared 
to if it had not been integrated. (2006, p. 962) 
 The application to IT portfolios in this case echoes that of the financial systems 
example, due to the complexity and interconnected nature of enterprise systems. 
“Interconnected” in this sense does not necessarily refer to technical 
specifications such as intra-system data exchange (though this can be true) but 
also includes interdependencies during the entire project lifecycle, such as 
requirements generation, design, and testing. 
The contagion effect can also permeate the teams working on the 
programs and subordinate projects mentioned above. As a subordinate project is 
impacted by external shocks, an emotional toll is taken on the teams. Barsade 
studied “Group emotional contagion, the transfer of moods among people in a 
group, and its influence on work group dynamics” and showed “…that emotional 
contagion does occur in groups and inasmuch as emotional contagion changes 
people's moods and serves as affective information, people are ‘walking mood 
inductors,’ continuously influencing the moods and then the judgments and 
behaviors of others” (2002, p. 667).  
Finally, the propagation of negative moods among teams influences the 
individual’s desire to perform. Rutner “examines an IT professional's emotional  
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dissonance…as a factor of IT professionals’ work exhaustion, job satisfaction, 
and turnover intention” (2008, p. 635). Work exhaustion, in turn, leads to 
increased turnover (Moore, 2000). 
Contagion effects move throughout the portfolio, organization, team, and 
individual levels with varying degrees of severity. 
F. SUMMARY 
In this chapter, the rationale for enterprise IT was explored. Development 
and management of enterprise IT systems and associated complexity was 
discussed. The importance of the portfolio, rather than simple project level view 
was emphasized. The concept of organizational realities, and the influence of 
explicit and implicit factors, was introduced. The contagion effect was defined 
and proposed to potentially result from interaction of organizational factors. The 
case study analysis of Chapter IV utilizes this structure to frame the results. 
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III. WATCHKEEPER AND MASI: INTERCONNECTED 
ENTERPRISE SYSTEMS 
A. OVERVIEW 
The WatchKeeper (WK) information system was a major acquisition 
managed by the USCG Acquisition Directorate (AD, CG-9), with development 
governed by the Major Systems Acquisition Manual (MSAM) and Systems 
Engineering Life Cycle (SELC). The Mission and Asset Scheduling Interface 
(MASI) information system was a non-major acquisition managed by the 
Command, Control, Communications, Computers and IT (C4&IT) Directorate 
(CG-6) in accordance with the USCG System Development Life Cycle (SDLC). In 
order to better understand what this means, an explanation of pertinent USCG 
organization and a primer on SDLC, MSAM, and SELC follows. Full SDLC and 
MSAM documentation is available from both the CG and DHS. The emphasis 
here is on the roles and responsibilities of the organizations, and the 
methodologies, specifically where they overlap, rather than on the process and 
steps themselves.  
B. USCG PERTINENT ORGANIZATION 
CG organizational structure as it pertains to the WK and MASI case study 
is presented here, along with primary roles and responsibilities. Figure 6 
illustrates CG headquarters directorates. Pertinent to the case study are CG-6, 



























Figure 6.  USCG Headquarters Directorates (after USCG, 2014) 
1. CG-6: Command, Control, Communications, Computers & IT 
Directorate 
Figure 7 illustrates the pertinent CG-6 organizational structure, and explicit 
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Figure 7.  C4IT Service Center (SC) Organization (after USCG SC, 
2014) 
 C4&IT Mission: “The Assistant Commandant for Command, 
Control, Communications, Computers and Information Technology 
(C4&IT)/CG-6 designs, develops, deploys, and maintains C4&IT 
solutions for the entire Coast Guard to enable mission execution 
and achieve the Coast Guard’s goals of maritime safety, security, 
and stewardship” (USCG, 2014). 
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 C4&IT Vision: “A Coast Guard ready with the right information at 
the right time to safeguard the Nation’s maritime domain” (USCG, 
2014). 
 C4IT SC Mission: “To be an adaptive and affordable service 
provider and protector of information and infrastructure that enable 
the Coast Guard to effectively execute its missions” (USCG SC, 
2014). 
 C4IT SC Vision: “Enable Coast Guard mission execution by 
providing high quality” (USCG SC, 2014): 
 Information and situation-awareness products and services, 
 Depot-level maintenance and repair services, 
 Resource transparency and total asset visibility, and 
 Stewardship and configuration management. (USCG SC, 
2014) 
 C4IT SC Purpose: “To enhance Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers and Information Technology's (C4IT) 
value in the performance of CG missions by providing and 
supporting systems and solutions that meet mission requirements” 
(USCG SC, 2014). 
The C4IT SC was established February 9, 2009 with the intention of 
combining all CG C4IT under a single management structure:  
C4IT Service Center consolidates electronics and IT support, 
including that provided by C3CEN [Command, Control, and 
Communications Engineering Center], TISCOM 
[Telecommunications and Information Systems Command], OSC 
[Operations Systems Center], and the Base C4IT Departments in 
order to provide depot-level information-technology support for all 
mission requirements. (USCG SC, 2014) 
Of note in the responsibilities of the C4IT SC is that they “Develop[s], test, 
deliver, and support all command & control, communications, computer and 
information technology systems, applications, and services” (USCG SC, 2014). 
Although the C4IT SC consolidates the COEs on an organizational chart, and 
provides another layer of hierarchy, operation of the individual COEs remained 
largely unchanged. 
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a. Centers of Excellence 
The CG has three geographically separate centers of excellence (COEs) 
in IT which support the mission of the C4IT SC. The COEs are peer 
organizations under the C4IT SC. Duplication of effort is undesirable but due to 
largely autonomous operation of COEs before formulation of the C4IT SC, 
duplicative development efforts persist, particularly between OSC and C3CEN. 
The COEs each have a rich heritage, and firm commitment to success, but they 
also see themselves as individual clans from a control perspective, and often find 
themselves in competition, rather than cooperation.  
(1) C3CEN: C3CEN is located in Portsmouth, Virginia. Among their 
responsibilities: 
The Command, Control, and Communications Engineering Center 
(C3CEN) develops, builds, fields, trains, and supports advanced 
electronic command, control, and navigation systems. C3CEN 
facilitates evolutionary engineering that focuses on the rapid 
deployment of essential functionality followed by planned 
improvements based on enhanced or refined requirements. (USCG 
C3CEN, 2014) 
 Mission: “We deliver, manage, and support mission-enabling 
Command, Control, Communications, Surveillance, and Navigation 
Capability through engineering rigor and standard processes you 
can trust” (USCG C3CEN, 2014). 
 Vision: “We will be the CG & DHS premier engineering, lifecycle, 
and service management center for Command, Control, 
Communications, Surveillance, and Navigation systems” (USCG 
C3CEN, 2014). 
(2) OSC: OSC is located in Kearneysville, West Virginia, and more 
narrowly defines their focus on MAIS. “The United States Coast Guard 
Operations Systems Center (OSC) is a government-owned, contractor-operated 
facility with the primary function of providing full life-cycle support for 
operationally-focused Coast Guard Automated Information Systems” (USCG 
OSC, 2014). 
 Mission: “The OSC develops, fields, maintains and provides user 
support for Coast Guard enterprise information systems to improve 
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Coast Guard mission performance through the innovative 
application of technology” (USCG OSC, 2014). 
 Vision: “To be the Premier Software Development Center for the 
Coast Guard and the Department of Homeland Security” (USCG 
OSC, 2014). 
(3) TISCOM: TISCOM is located in Alexandria, Virginia, and focuses 
on infrastructure as well as associated information assurance concerns. MAIS 
must satisfy TISCOM infrastructure requirements in order to operate on the CG 
network. “TISCOM is a part of the C4IT Service Center and serves as the Coast 
Guard's Center of Excellence (COE) for enterprise information technology 
infrastructure” (USCG TISCOM, 2014). 
2. CG-7: Capability Directorate 
 Mission: “Capabilities Provider—The directorate responsible for 
identifying and providing capabilities, competencies, and capacity 
and developing standards for the staffing, training, equipping, 
sustaining, maintaining, and employing CG forces to meet mission 
requirements” (USCG, 2014). 
CG-7 is commanded by a rear admiral and includes several sub-units. 
Pertinent sub-units to the WK and MASI case study are: 
 CG-741: Office of Shore Forces 
 Mission: “The mission of Coast Guard Shore Forces is to 
provide unity of command, and align shore structures to 
improve mission execution of all Coast Guard missions in 
the maritime domain” (USCG, 2014). 
 CG-761 Office of C4 & Sensors Capabilities 
 Mission: “CG-761 is a team of professionals representing all 
mission communities who combine Coast Guard operations 
experience and various C4 & Sensors knowledge to achieve 
mission execution capability and system interoperability with 
outside agencies. Using this unique combination, CG-761 
liaisons between stakeholders, user communities and 
technical authorities to generate requirements, set priorities, 
and negotiate fulfillment of user C4 & Sensor needs” (USCG, 
2014). 
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3. CG-9: Acquisition Directorate 
 Mission: “Efficiently and effectively deliver the capabilities needed 
to execute the full range of Coast Guard missions” (USCG AD, 
2014). 
The CG Acquisition Directorate was established in 2007, consolidating 
prior directorates and offices in order “to provide a single point of management 
and to act as the systems integrator for all Coast Guard Major Systems 
Acquisitions” (USCG AD, 2013, p. 1.2). CG-9 is commanded by a rear admiral, 
and manages significant funds. “The Coast Guard is investing approximately $30 
billion in major acquisition projects that purchase and modernize the service’s 
ships, boats, aircraft, and command, control, communication, computers, 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems” (USCG AD, 
2014). Acquisition directorate projects include major information systems 
development such as CG-LIMS (enterprise logistics), Rescue 21 (direction and 
location), and IOC (includes WK). Of particular interest to WK and MASI are: 
 CG-93: Director of Acquisition Program Executive Officer 
 “Provides certified acquisition management of the Coast 
Guard’s investment programs. CG-93’s Level 1 (totaling 
more than $1 billion in lifecycle cost) and Level 2 (totaling 
between $300 million and $1 billion in lifecycle cost) projects 
deliver the service’s next-generation aviation, surface and 
C4ISR assets” (USCG AD, 2014). 
 CG-9333: Project Manager (Command21/IPSOC) 
 Command21 was the prior name for the WatchKeeper 
project which is the “heart” of the Interagency Operation 
Centers mandated by the SAFE Port act of 2006. 
4. CG-DCMS: Deputy Commandant for Mission Support 
“The Deputy Commandant for Mission Support (DCMS) organization is 
responsible for all facets of life-cycle management for Coast Guard assets, from 
acquisition through decommissioning” (USCG DCMS, 2014). CG assets include 
acquisitions and IT systems. DCMS holds technical control over CG-6 and CG-9 
and is commanded by a vice admiral (O-9).  
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The four DCMS Assistant Commandants, CG-1 (Human 
Resources), CG-4 (Engineering and Logistics), CG-6 (C4IT) and 
CG-9 (Acquisitions), coordinate the planning, policy and budget for 
six Logistics and Service Centers in the field. The centers provide 
the technical authority and oversight for maintenance and support 
of all Coast Guard assets. (USCG DCMS, 2014) 
5. CG-6 and CG-9 Interaction in IS Development 
The activities of CG-6 and CG-9 have the potential to overlap, particularly 
in the case of IT systems acquisition and development, and they are directed to 
cooperate: 
Working closely with Coast Guard Headquarters partners, such as 
the Assistant Commandant for Engineering and Logistics (CG-4) 
and the Assistant Commandant for C4IT (CG-6), the Acquisition 
Directorate develops acquisition strategies that deliver affordable 
assets that meet mission requirements, as defined by the Deputy 
Commandant for Operations, and sponsored by the Assistant 
Commandant for Capability (CG-7). (USCG AD, 2014) 
Although strategy is formed jointly, a major acquisition project is developed and 
controlled by CG-9. In enterprise systems, however, one system may rely 
extensively upon another system. A CG-6 system may become an integral part of 
a larger CG-9 system. In this case, who ultimately makes decisions for the CG-6 
system? Figure 8 illustrates the process by which other CG directorates may 
have input in acquisition programs. System reviews with participation of CG-6 are 
typically at the senior executive level. The executive oversight council (EOC) is 
described as: 
A Flag/SES-level forum that monitors major risks, addresses 
emergent issues, reviews [acquisition decision event] ADE exit 
criteria, and provides direction to cross-directorate teams as 
required to support successful execution of major acquisition 
projects. The EOC includes key stakeholders in the acquisition 
process. (USCG AD, 2013, p. 7.2) 
Although the EOC includes stakeholders, they are also at the senior level. A 
potential issue in portfolio development involving CG-6 and CG-9 systems is lack 
of direction to the cross directorate teams due to the abstracted view seen by 
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senior management. The EOC, by its nature, is more focused on major risks and 
emergent issues than resolution of system requirements or interoperability 
concerns at the touch-points between CG-6 and CG-9 systems at the 
development level. Raising low level concerns to the attention of the EOC is not 
typically practical or preferable. If the sponsoring directorate between the 
different systems is the same, requirements can be clarified between systems; 
however coordination of development schedules remains problematic. 
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Figure 8.  Coast Guard Acquisition Review Organization (from USCG AD, 2013, p. 1.6) 
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For additional detail in Acquisition Directorate organization as well as 
decision making bodies, see the USCG Major Systems Acquisition Manual 
(MSAM) referenced (USCG AD, 2013) below. 
C. USCG SDLC AND MSAM/SELC 
1. Overview 
The CG acquisition process follows the DHS Acquisition Directive 102-01 
series which consolidates DHS-wide acquisition management policy. MSAM 
governs major C4IT acquisitions, while SDLC governs non-major C4IT programs. 
“All USCG C4&IT acquisitions not following MSAM, shall follow the SDLC” 
(USCG C4IT, 2011, p. 1). When the need for a C4IT system is determined, CG-6 
facilitates the decision process of major versus non-major primarily based on Life 
Cycle Cost Estimates (LCCEs). All potential systems are initiated within the 
SDLC process. When an acquisition is determined to be “major,” MSAM 
processes will be followed. SELC is part of the MSAM process. “MSAM includes 
satisfying the requirements of the SELC. Commandant (CG-6) is responsible for 
conducting SELC Reviews” (USCG C4IT, 2011, p. 29). Figure 9 illustrates the 
high level process. 
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SDLC Relationship with Acquisition MSAM/SELC
Enterprise Architecture
(CG-66)























Figure 9.  Major (MSAM/SELC) and Non-Major (SDLC) Acquisition Flow (from USCG C4IT, 2011, p. 30) 
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2. SDLC Purpose, Scope, Roles, and Responsibility 
 Purpose: “The Coast Guard SDLC process is a comprehensive 
management approach that conceives and implements technology 
solutions designed to ensure that the right organizations and 
individuals are involved in each phase of the process, thereby 
raising the probability of success” (USCG C4IT, 2011, p. 1). 
 Scope: SDLC applies to all non-major C4&IT systems. 
Figure 10 illustrates the SDLC roles and responsibilities framework. The 
framework establishes directorate roles and illustrates the coordination 
necessary for C4IT system and services development. The three groups shown 



























Figure 10.  SDLC System Centric Roles (from USCG C4IT, 2011, p. 3) 
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 Asset Manager (AM): “Shall guide, oversee, and monitor execution 
of SDLC for the assigned system. The Asset Manager shall 
collaborate with the Sponsor’s Representative, the SDA, and the 
System Support Agent (SSA) to ensure alignment and compliance 
with SDLC policies and practices” (USCG C4IT, 2011, p. 4). 
 Sponsor: “The sponsor has typically identified the ‘need’ and 
hence defines and validates program goals and functional 
requirements, and officially accepts the final system. Interaction 
with the sponsor via the sponsor’s representative is critical to 
defining the right system. Among the sponsor’s responsibilities is 
acquiring the resources to implement and support the system 
through collaboration with the sponsor’s representative and the 
asset manager. In keeping with the responsibility to define 
requirements, the sponsor identifies and facilitates resolution of 
issues related to requirements” (USCG C4IT, 2011). 
 Sponsor’s Representative: “Designated by the sponsor to directly 
liaise with AM, SDA, and SSA. This team works closely with each 
other, customers, users, and stakeholders. The sponsor’s 
representative is responsible for articulating requirements on behalf 
of the sponsor, as well as developing cost estimates and resolving 
development issues with the team at this level. Also relays change 
requests and collaborates in creation of the SDLC tailoring plan” 
(USCG C4IT, 2011). 
 System Development Agent (SDA): “The identified individual, 
unit, firm, agency, or organization that performs, or has the 
responsibility for, design, development, and implementation of 
C4&IT systems, as well as the acquisition of C4&IT products or 
services” (USCG C4IT, 2011, p. 7). Collaborates with AM, 
sponsor’s representative, and SSA, as well as customers, users, 
and stakeholders.  
 System Support Agent (SSA): “The SSA is the identified 
individual, unit, firm, agency, or organization that has responsibility 
for maintenance, support, and availability of a system” (USCG 
C4IT, 2011, p. 7). Among SSA responsibilities are maintaining and 
supporting system services, sustaining availability, and defining, 
tracking, and reporting support measures (USCG C4IT, 2011). 
3. MSAM/SELC Purpose, Scope, Roles, and Responsibility 
 Purpose: “Acquire and deliver more capable, interoperable assets 
and systems, and high quality, timely services that support Coast 
Guard forces in executing missions effectively and efficiently” 
(USCG AD, 2013). 
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 Scope: Applies to all major C4&IT systems. 
 Program Manager (PgM): “The individual who has responsibility 
and authority to determine the strategic vision of a program [in this 
context, a specific portfolio of functionally similar systems]. The 
PgM is responsible for establishing a portfolio focus across projects 
within the portfolio. The PgM is accountable for establishing starts 
and closeouts, and communication with entities outside 
Commandant (CG-9)” (USCG AD, 2013, p. 1.10). Unlike SDLC, 
which is system oriented, MSAM adds a portfolio management 
approach in addition to the system oriented SELC process. Details 
regarding this critical function are available in the MSAM. 
 Project Manager (PM): “The PM is the chartered individual who 
has responsibility and authority to accomplish project objectives for 
developing, producing, and deploying a new asset with logistics 
support to meet identified operational requirements. The PM is 
accountable for meeting established cost, schedule, and 
performance parameters established by the Acquisition Decision 
Authority (ADA), and works under the guidance and supervision of 
the…portfolio Program Manager” (USCG AD, 2013 p. 1.7). PMs are 
required to integrate the three primary management areas shown in 
Figure 11 into a coherent strategy to achieve specific cost, 
schedule, and performance parameters for their assigned projects 
(USCG AD, 2013, p. 2.1). “The PM is the key individual for 
acquisition project execution. PMs are accountable for the 
successful execution of their projects. PMs’ span of control is such 
that they must be autonomous, trained, resourced, empowered, 
and accountable to senior management for the effort. This all-
encompassing level of authority and responsibility is the foundation 
for the Coast Guard’s PM-centric acquisition execution model” 
(USCG AD, 2013, p. 1.8). The PM level is similar to that of the AM 
in the SDLC process. 
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Figure 11.  MSAM Management Interfaces (from USCG AD, 2013, p. 2.1) 
 Sponsor: Similar responsibilities to those outlined in the SDLC 
process. For SELC reviews the sponsor is also known as the Lead 
Operational Authority (USCG AD, 2013). 
 Sponsor’s Representative: Similar responsibilities to those 
outlined in the SDLC process. 
4. SDLC and MSAM/SELC Authority 
The author is not an expert in either SDLC or MSAM/SELC processes, but 
the documents are ambiguous regarding whether CG-6 or CG-9 wields final 
control in C4IT system development cases. As seen in the sections pertaining to 
CG directorates, mention is made of collaboration. MSAM includes a description 
of Technical Authorities (TAs): 
The Commandant has designated TAs to serve as the Coast 
Guard’s authoritative experts in providing the authority, 
responsibility, and accountability to establish, monitor, and approve 
technical standards, tools, and processes, and certify projects in 
conformance with statute, policy, requirements, architectures, and 
standards. (USCG AD, 2013, p. 1.15) 
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The TA for C4IT systems is CG-6: “Commandant (CG-6) is designated as the TA 
for the design, development, deployment, security, protection, and maintenance 
of all Coast Guard C4IT systems and assets. C4IT Systems Development Life 
Cycle (SDLC), COMDTINST 5230.66 (series), applies” (USCG AD, 2013, 
p.1.16). Yet in the SDLC manual under a section addressing major C4IT 
acquisitions: “Activities involved in the acquisition life cycle for major C4&IT 
acquisitions are governed by policies and practices outside of Commandant (CG-
6), with Commandant (CG-6) satisfying an advisory and review role in the 
process” (USCG C4IT, 2011, p. 28). CG-6 formally reviews major acquisition 
progress during acquisition decision events (ADEs) using criteria defined in 
“SDLC Phase Exit Approval,” though MSAM does not follow SDLC. As such, CG-
6 can require additional information from CG-9 during an ADE. Figure 9 also 
illustrates upon MSAM completion a C4IT system reenters the SDLC process 
flow for Operations and Maintenance (O&M). This suggests CG-6 is able to 
substantially influence the content and process of a major acquisition via the 
power of unfavorable reviews or refusal to accept an acquisition system to O&M, 
and also suggests CG-6 limitation of CG-9 PM authority. The process is further 
complicated when a portfolio view is embraced, or programs are considered 
rather than individual projects. A major acquisition program may include multiple 
projects, including non-major CG-6 projects. The problem introduced is lack of 
control clarity for individual projects under the larger program. Ideally 
collaboration between CG-9 and CG-6 would suffice, but explicit and implicit 
organizational factors may cause conflict. 
5. SDLC and MSAM/SELC Phase Comparison 
Although the emphasis of the case study is roles and responsibilities for 
SDLC and MSAM/SELC, a comparison of the SDLC and SELC phases is 
presented for completeness. Figure 12 illustrates alignment between phases for 
the two methodologies. 
 












































SPR SER PPR SDR PDR CDR TRR PRR ORR PIR
PAA PAA PAA PAA PAA PAA
SPR: Study Plan Review
SER: Solution Engineering 
Review
PPR: Project Planning 
Review
SDR: System Definition 
Review
PDR: Preliminary Design 
Review
CDR: Critical Design Review
TRR: Test Readiness Review




PIR: Post Implemenation 
Review
PAA: Phase Approval 
Authority
 
Figure 12.  SELC and SDLC Phase Comparison (after USCG CG6, 2011, p.17) 
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D. WATCHKEEPER 
1. Purpose, Capability, and Objectives 
WatchKeeper (WK) was the enterprise IT system to be designed in 
support of the Interagency Operations Centers (IOC) project mandated by 
section 108 of the Security and Accountability for Every Port (SAFEPort) Act of 
2006. Figure 13 is an early-concept graphic which illustrates WK as the 
aggregator of data from several other enterprise systems. The overarching IOC 
project involved WatchKeeper in addition to physical facilities and sensor 
networks. 
 
Figure 13.  WatchKeeper/C21 Early System Vision (from USCG AD, 
2010) 
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 IOC Acquisition Project Purpose: “To transform Coast Guard 
Sector Command Centers (SCC) or other DHS infrastructure to 
host interagency members and meet the challenges of interagency 
coordination and maritime security. The volume of maritime domain 
awareness (MDA) information necessary to manage Coast Guard 
and interagency operations has increased dramatically and 
exceeded the field’s capacity to collect and process it. As the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) lead for maritime security, 
the Coast Guard needs new information management capabilities 
to solve the coordination and operational challenges faced by 
today’s interagency decision makers” (USCG CG761/CG741, 2010, 
p. ES.1). A primary purpose was to build IOCs in high priority ports. 
Initial plans for the IOC project called for segment 1 to be the development 
and fielding of the WK system, while segment 2 would see further refinement of 
WK and integration with existing port and waterways sensor networks. Segments 
3 and 4 exceed the scope of this study, and sensor integration was de-scoped 
and never implemented due to funding and development issues. 
The WatchKeeper information system was envisioned to support three 
operational capabilities: 
 Integrated Vessel Targeting (IVT): “Integrates targeting results of 
agency-specific screening processes and builds a consolidated 
threat picture of people, vessels and cargo operating within IOC 
OPAREA as provided by intelligence and law enforcement 
communities in support of the Ports, Waterways and Coastal 
Security mission” (USCG CG761/CG741, 2010, p. ES.1). 
 Interagency Operational Planning (IOP): “Integrates federal, 
state, and local asset status and schedules. Mission Requests are 
created from Integrated Vessel Targeting results, along with other 
mission demand sources, such as regattas, patrols, and escort 
missions. These Mission Requests are prioritized by IOC decision 
makers, who assign assets to missions. These assignments form 
the IOC Daily schedule” (USCG CG761/CG741, 2010, p. ES.1). 
 Operations Monitoring (OM): “Manages the IOC Daily Schedule 
against all emergent events, such as search and rescue, spills, and 
other events occurring outside the operational planning window. 
Creates and shares the tactical picture, including command and 
control, mission status, and status of IOC forces/Blue Force Tracks 
(BFT)” (USCG CG761/CG741, 2010, p. ES.1). 
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Expectations were high for IOC and WK. The congressional mandate and 
DHS assignment of the CG to handle the acquisition were a major investment in 
the ability of the CG to deliver the expected system. Stakeholders identified in the 
SAFE Port Act included:  
U. S. Customs and Border Patrol, U. S. Immigrations and Customs 
Enforcement, Transportation Security Administration, the 
Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, and other 
Federal agencies, State and local law enforcement or port security 
personnel, members of the Area Maritime Security Committee, and 
other public and private sector stakeholders adversely affected by a 
transportation security incident or transportation disruption. (USCG 
CG761/CG741, 2010, p. 1.1) 
These stakeholders were collectively referred to as “port partners” and enabling 
port partner participation in the WK system was a key priority. As presented in 
the Maritime Port Operations Handbook (2009) IOC objectives were: 
 Provide enhanced information sharing between port partners. 
 Foster planning and coordination efforts with local DHS and other 
Federal, State, and local partners on a regular schedule through 
designated points of contact. 
 Coordinate local asset operations to improve mission performance, 
eliminate redundancy in mission execution and avoid mission 
conflicts. 
 Conduct risk assessment and analysis, resulting in risk 
management of operations. (USCG CG-761 & CG-741, 2010, p. 1-
2) 
2. Development Methodology 
The IOC project and WatchKeeper were a major acquisition under CG-9. 
As defined earlier, CG-6 was the technical authority for the WatchKeeper C4IT 
system, and WK followed MSAM/SELC processes. In 2012, WatchKeeper was 
officially downgraded to a non-major acquisition. For the majority of its 
development, however, it was a major acquisition, and after the downgrade it 
continued to be overseen by CG-9333. The extent to which the WK effort 
conformed to MSAM/SELC is not directly the emphasis of this study. 
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3. Roles 
Chapter III, Section B defines relevant CG directorates and COEs. 
Chapter III, Section C.3 defines typical MSAM roles. Terminology in this section 
follows MSAM except where noted. WK roles are listed below: 
 PM: CG-9333 
 TA: CG-6 
 Sponsor: CG-741 
 Sponsor’s Representative: CG-761 
 SDA: C3CEN. Although SDA is an SDLC term, it accurately 
describes C3CEN as the lead developers of WK. 
 SSA: OSC: SSA is also an SDLC term, but accurately describes 
OSC as maintaining WK physical servers, providing helpdesk 
support, and interfacing with other enterprise systems on behalf of 
WK. 
Both C3CEN and OSC are CG or government run, with primarily a 
contractor workforce. Several contracting companies were involved in 
requirements gathering and development and will only be mentioned as pertinent 
to the case study. 
E. MASI 
Figure 14 illustrates a sample view of the MASI system as seen by an end 
user. 
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Figure 14.  MASI Example Weekly View 
1. Purpose, Capability, and Objectives 
The predecessor to MASI was a system named MHS-Ops (Maritime 
Homeland Security Operations). MHS-Ops was originally selected by the 
WatchKeeper program as a nearly-ready capability which could fulfill WK IOP 
requirements. IOP requirements represented one third of the overall WK system 
(see Figure 15). MHS-Ops was a siloed system developed locally at USCG 
Sector Seattle, and used for planning and scheduling of sector assets at Seattle 
and other locations. OSC was identified to review the MHS-Ops system for 
suitability of inclusion in WK, and extension to full USCG use as an enterprise 
tool. Unfortunately, security and other operational flaws were revealed which not 
only made MHS-Ops unsuitable for enterprise use, or use with WK, but also 
identified its continued use as a risk to the CG. Fielding of an alternate system 
was ordered by CG-6, the designated approving authority (DAA), not only to 
serve WK requirements, but also to enable transition of MHS-Ops users and 
shutdown of the system. MHS-Ops users were distinct from WK users, and 
would not use WK. 
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Figure 15.  MASI Relation to WK Primary Capabilities (from MASI 
development documents, 2011) 
The MASI project was conceived to deliver capability similar to MHS-Ops, 
but in an enterprise system which complied with established standards for 
security and quality. The system would be used by the USCG as well as provide 
IOP functionality for WK. Although MASI requirements would shift and grow 
significantly throughout development, its primary purpose was to provide a single 
view of missions which were planned, underway, or completed, the assets 
assigned to those missions, and asset status and availability. The tool would 
facilitate both horizontal and vertical transparency by creating a common 
operational picture, viewable by all decision makers. In the case of MASI 
functionality for WK, this included all port partners external to the CG, as well as 
their assets, and planning and scheduling needs. Desired MASI capabilities (non-
WK specific) as outlined by LaSalle, included: 
 A single user interface will provide a near-real-time presentation of 
all resources and statuses. 
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 A single user interface will provide a near-real-time presentation of 
all mission assignments planned, underway, and completed. 
 A single user interface will provide a near-real-time presentation of 
significant events that will influence planning decisions. 
 Planners will enter planning and scheduling information and 
decisions in one place: MASI. 
 Units and command centers will then use MASI to manage the 
assigned missions and to support post-mission reporting. 
 A single location will be available for the display of resource and 
mission planning and execution, optimizing resource utilization 
against the highest priority missions. 
 Horizontal and vertical awareness will be provided for resource and 
mission planning, integration, and execution. 
 The requirement for reporting will not change, but the system will 
support standard reporting procedures. 
 MDA will be enhanced by providing command centers with single 
source visibility of all activities in the area of responsibility—
planned, underway, and completed. 
 The system will contribute to the standardization of data 
management and, by extension, an increase in data integrity within 
authoritative systems. (LaSalle, 2013, p. 38) 
Figure 16 illustrates high-level MASI 1.0 architecture. Figure 17 shows 
MASI 1.2 architectural alterations created to enable WK State of the Port (SOP) 
functionality. Figure 18 shows the additional complexity required of the tool to 
support full WK IOP functionality. Appendix B details, at a high level, the 
complete re-architecture required between MASI 1.1 and MASI 2.0 to support 
WK IOP. The complexity required of MASI 2.0 was considerable. MASI users 
would reside in multiple security domains, and exceeded the set of WK users. 
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Figure 16.  MASI 1.0 Architectural Diagram (from MASI development 
documents, 2011)
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Figure 17.  MASI 1.2 (SOP) Architectural Diagram (from MASI development documents, 2011)
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Figure 18.  MASI 2.0 Notional Architecture in Support of WK IOP (from MASI development documents, 2011) 
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2. Development Methodology 
The MASI project was a non-major acquisition under CG-6 and followed 
the SDLC process. Although MASI was expected to fulfill one third of WK 
functionality, it was not a subsystem of WK. It was an enterprise system in its 
own right that was expected to couple with WK to supply expected functionality. 
This placed the MASI system in the interesting situation of being a CG-6 project 
susceptible to CG-9 direction via an eventual WK master schedule. The dynamic 
was further complicated because CG-6 was the TA for WK, creating an 
ambiguous, potentially circular explicit authority structure. 
3. Roles 
Chapter III, Section B defines relevant CG directorates and COEs. 
Chapter III, Section C.2 defines typical SDLC roles. Terminology in this section 
follows SDLC. MASI roles are listed below: 
 AM: CG-633 
 Sponsor: CG-741 
 Sponsor’s Representative: CG-761. “Initially Sponsor and 
Sponsor’s Representative roles were reversed, but for the majority 
of the project they were assigned as stated” (LaSalle, 2013, p. 33). 
 SDA: OSC 
 SSA: OSC 
As mentioned, OSC is a CG facility, with a contractor workforce. CG-9 did 
not hold an official role in the MASI project from an SDLC perspective. 
F. CONCURRENT DEVELOPMENT ISSUES WITH CG-6 AND CG-9 
INTERCONNECTED PEER SYSTEMS 
The preceding sections of this chapter have provided a great deal of 
information specific to CG operation and procedures for IT development and IT 
acquisitions. The information was not only provided to enable understanding of 
the WK and MASI case study analysis, but also to present the very complex web 
of directorate and procedural interdependencies involved. Less complicated 
examples certainly exist, and successful development of systems has been 
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accomplished by the same entities which became so entangled in the WK and 
MASI development. An IT system developed by a single COE, and overseen by 
only CG-6 or CG-9 has at least an industry average chance of success. The 
failure of the initial promise of WK and the final disposition of MASI were greatly 
influenced by the complex nature of the programs themselves, and the intricate 
web of intra-directorate funding priorities, clan control, and capacity issues. 
Chapter IV will demonstrate the significant roles played by the various 
directorates, both at the senior and middle management levels. 
G. METHODOLOGY PART II—VALIDITY AND ANALYSIS 
As mentioned in the “Methodology Part 1” section (Chapter I, Section F), 
validity is supported through the use of multiple strategies (Cresswell, 2009). 
Triangulation, rich narrative, member checking, extensive participant involvement 
and explanation of participant bias were utilized. 
Using terminology from Chapter III, and assigned roles in Sections D.3 
and E.3, the participant observer’s position within WK and MASI may be defined. 
The participant observer led the MASI SDA/SSA team, and led the WK SSA 
team. In the MASI SDA/SSA leadership capacity, the participant was directly 
involved in all MASI development team activity, all MASI requirements task order 
(MRTO) activity, was responsible for managing the project budget, participated in 
extensive meetings with the middle management (O-4) layer of various 
headquarters stakeholders (CG-633, CG-741, CG-761, CG-9333), met with 
C3CEN SDA’s, managed MASI project plans, and was responsible for weekly 
MASI SDA summaries provided to OSC command. The participant was also 
instrumental in all MASI system demonstrations to senior stakeholders, (O-6, O-
7, Senior Executive Service—SES) and participated in several senior stakeholder 
program briefs. In the WK SSA leadership capacity, the participant interfaced 
between WK and all other OSC enterprise systems (Customer Service 
Department—CSD, Maritime Awareness Global Network—MAGNET, Marine 
Information for Safety and Law Enforcement—MISLE, Nationwide Automatic 
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Identification System—NAIS, etc.), provided WK infrastructure support, 
participated in middle management and senior stakeholder meetings, and 
completed a weekly summary of WK SSA events. The participant did not 
contribute to formulation of WK specific project plans or in assignment of 
development work. The participant budgeted support of the WK physical system 
and support, but was not involved in the WK development budget. The WK SDA 
team was located at C3CEN in Virginia, and the MASI SDA team was located in 
West Virginia. The participant’s most detailed information originates from the 
MASI SDA position. Although the WK SSA position afforded the participant an 
extensive view of WK development, the exposure was less direct than that 
afforded by the MASI position. 
Middle management interaction was a pervasive constant throughout the 
project timeline and often occurred at CG headquarters (CG-9333, CG-741, CG-
633, and CG-761). Military middle management was typically at the lieutenant 
commander (O-4) level, and reported to the directorate heads at the captain (O-
6) level. Influence at levels higher than captain was rare, and explicitly noted 
where it occurred. OSC and C3CEN development teams reported to HQ middle 
managers for project concerns (and to local superiors for COE issues). Middle 
management and senior leadership data has been gathered from official 
meetings and frequent emails, but no direct perspective was available due to 
geographical separation. The primary goal of the participant observer was to see 
both programs succeed but he had a more direct investment in the MASI 
program. 
Given the inherent complexity involved in the WK and MASI story, 
simplification was necessary to enable focus on critical areas, while maintaining 
an overall narrative. To this end, hundreds of files, emails, requirements, and 
design documents for both WK and MASI were compiled and analyzed. These 
resources, in addition to participant program summaries, (spanning 2010 to 
2012) were used to build a temporal timeline of significant WK and MASI events. 
This timeline was comprised of six event columns spanning 218 time segments 
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for a possible 1308 events, although the total was less because every event 
column did not contain an entry for each time segment. This list was further 
reduced to 40 significant and representative events, which are presented (Table 
2) and briefly explained (Appendix A). The events were chosen prior to 
classification as “explicit” or “implicit,” and predated formation of the propositions 
which emerged from the study. These events were classified according to 
primary organizational factors defined in Chapter II. From this list, an activity 
matrix was created which illustrates dependencies between events. From the 
activity matrix, an activity-on-node diagram was created to graphically illustrate 
temporal flow and event dependency. This diagram also represented “actors” in 
“swimlanes” to further clarify the primary “owners” of an event, or the primary 
recipient of event action. Selected portions of the timeline were selected for 
narrative treatment to further illustrate interdependency of organizational factors, 
the complex network problem, and contagion effect. From this analysis, four 
themes (sets of proposals) emerged. 
H. SUMMARY 
Explanation of explicit CG organization as it pertained to the case study 
was presented in this chapter. The SDLC and MSAM/SELC processes were 
reviewed not only to explain the explicit CG method for IT development and 
acquisition, but also to illustrate the ambiguous nature of the processes. WK and 
MASI were introduced to provide background on their intended purpose and to 
define their interdependencies at the conceptual level. Issues were discussed 
which arise during concurrent development of interdependent systems, one 
governed by SDLC, the other by MSAM/SELC. Finally, methodology and validity 
were discussed, as well as the method of analysis utilized in Chapter IV. 
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IV. WATCHKEEPER PORTFOLIO IMPACTS 
A. WATCHKEEPER DEVELOPMENT ISSUES 
The emphasis of analysis in this study is not the extent to which WK 
satisfied the objectives of the IOC program but rather an investigation into how its 
problems affected the MASI program, and to a lesser extent, other portfolio 
programs. A summary of published WK difficulties is presented below for 
completeness, as well as in support of claims presented during analysis. WK has 
had well documented developmental issues spanning the process from 
requirements through implementation. In two separate studies published in 2012 
and 2013 the GAO notes the following regarding the IOC WK program: 
 The Coast Guard has not defined WatchKeeper requirements, cost, 
and schedule in accordance with established guidance. For 
example, the Coast Guard designed and developed the initial 
WatchKeeper segment without first defining the specific functions 
that the system is to perform. (GAO, 2012, p. 2) 
 The Coast Guard did not fully define requirements prior to 
designing, developing, testing, and deploying WatchKeeper. 
Recognized guidance calls for first defining business requirements 
that describe how users will interact with the system, and user 
needs in terms of what the system is to do and how it is to do it, to 
ensure that the developed system satisfies user needs…Although 
the Coast Guard developed draft high-level business requirements 
for WatchKeeper, it did not define the specific functions that the 
system is to perform. (GAO, 2012, p. 29) 
 The Coast Guard has not developed a reliable cost estimate to 
guide and inform the WatchKeeper investment. For example, the 
estimate does not include all government costs, such as related 
program-management costs. (GAO, 2012, p. 2) 
 WatchKeeper development and deployment has not been guided 
by a reliable schedule of the work needed to be performed and the 
key activities that need to occur. In particular, the schedule does 
not link all activities so that the project office can determine how a 
slip in a particular task may affect other related tasks, or the overall 
schedule. (GAO, 2012, p. 2) 
 …according to the October 2009 IOC Project Management Plan, 
Segment 1 (WK) was to be deployed to all 35 sectors by March 
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2011 and Segment 2 by December 2015. According to the 
Acquisition Program Baseline, which was approved by DHS in 
September 2011, Segment 1 is now to be deployed to 17 of the 35 
sectors by June 2012, and to the remaining 18 sectors and 
Segment 2 to all 35 sectors by March 2017. (GAO, 2012, p. 2) 
 Prior to the initial deployment of WatchKeeper, the Coast Guard 
made only limited efforts to determine port partner needs for the 
system. (GAO, 2013a, p. 16) 
When asked what they viewed as causes of WK problems, “Project 
officials attributed these limitations to an aggressive IOC development schedule, 
limited resources, and competing priorities” (GAO, 2012, p. 2). Although the 
officials interviewed by the GAO in 2011 did realize at a high level where the 
project had gone astray, they did not successfully alter the result by the time of 
the 2013 follow-on study (the focus of the 2013 study was not exclusively the 
IOC WK program). 
In 2013, LCDR LaSalle also commented on WK’s challenges from an 
internal perspective as the sponsor’s representative (CG-761). Regarding the 
relation between CG-7 and C3CEN (formerly named C2CEN): 
Besides the normal disagreements and uncertainties that are 
present in any project, this project had a level of animosity between 
stakeholders because of military ranks that were involved. There 
were meetings where quarreling dominated the agenda, and there 
was a lack of trust between stakeholders that at times bordered on 
resentment. C2CEN felt that nobody trusted its efforts, while both 
directorates in CG-7 felt that C2CEN was not being honest with the 
development efforts that were underway. (LaSalle, 2013, p. 51) 
Regarding the downgrade of the intended WK production release to “technical 
demonstrator”: 
The WatchKeeper project also failed to meet testing events. 
Because of this failure, the Coast Guard finally decided—with 
pressure from the DHS—to reduce the scope of WatchKeeper. 
Therefore, in 2010, the DHS gave the direction that WatchKeeper 
was to be deployed as a technology demonstrator rather than a full-
fledged system of record, which removed the MSAM requirements 
from the WatchKeeper effort. This decision came at a price. The 
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WatchKeeper project realized substantial funding cuts, and there 
was operational backlash as well. (LaSalle, 2013, p. 52) 
Unfortunately, as the remainder of the study demonstrates, WK was 
unable to contain the effects from its many developmental and managerial 
issues, as they rippled through the portfolio to affect MASI as well. 
B. SIGNIFICANT WK AND MASI EVENTS ANALYSIS 
As outlined in Chapter III, Section G, Table 2 contains the abbreviated list 
of significant events from the WK and MASI program timelines, which were used 
to construct the event matrix diagram in Figure 19. Table 2 contains the event 
number, event name, type, category, and severity. Severity is rated on a scale 
from one to ten, with ten as the most severe. The severity rating is relative to the 
effect of the event on the MASI program. For example, E6 represented a critical 
blow to WK, but had less direct effect on MASI, and therefore the severity rating 
is lower. If severity were geared to WK, E6 would have been an 8. Appendix A 
also lists the events of Table 2, but includes a detailed description of each event 
to include date, supporting details, historical context, implications, and impact. 
The severity ratings were assigned based on the effect of the event on the MASI 
program as a whole. In this manner, impact may differ from the severity rating. 
As an example, event E4 was more severe than E3, but the direct cost impact of 
E4 was significantly less. 
Discussions of requirements in the CG reflect three levels of abstraction. 
Operational requirements are the highest description of need. Functional 
requirements are more specific, but still insufficient for system design. System 
level requirements are at the level required for coding and system design. 
Creation of system level requirements from functional requirements is often 
referred to as “decomposing” the functional requirements. This language is used 
extensively in Appendix A, and in the descriptions which follow. The brief listing 
of events follows in Table 2. 
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E1 IOC WK pORD Published Explicit   3 





Re-write (MASI Creation) and Discontinuation of MHS-
Ops Mandated. Port Partner Access Critical 
Implicit Control 5 
E4 MASI 1.0 not Accessible By WK Port Partners Implicit Control 8 
E5 IOC ORD Published Explicit   3 
E6 
WK Insufficient for Production Release, Approved for 
Release as Technical Demonstrator Instead, without 
MASI 
Implicit Control 4 
E7 MASI 1.0 Test Deployment Failure at CG Sector Seattle Implicit Control 8 
E8 Executive Oversight Council (EOC) "Getback" Meeting Implicit Control 4 
E9 IOC APG Published Explicit   2 
E10 MRTO Created  Implicit Capacity 5 
E11 
EOC Mandated October 2011 MASI 2.0 Development 
Completion 
Implicit Control 8 
E12 
CG-633/CG-761/CG-741 MASI 1.1 Prioritization 
Decision 
Implicit Control 5 











IOC FRD Published By CG-9333 Subcontractors. CG-
9333 Attempts to Control and Limit MASI 
Requirements Generation 
Implicit Control 4 
E14 
Power and Control Struggles Begin at Initial MRTO 
and Stakeholder (CG-9333, CG-761, CG-741, C3CEN, 
and OSC) Meeting 
Implicit Control 6 
E15 AMT Non-Delivery by C3CEN Implicit Capacity 6 
E16 
CG-9333 Provided Nine Months of MASI Funding for 
2011 Development 
Explicit   4 
E17 
MASI 1.1 Deployed, Users Happy. CG-761/CG-741/CG-
633 Delay Official Release 
Explicit   8 
E18 MASI 1.1 SDLC Documentation Incomplete Implicit Capacity 5 
E19 
WK Does not Add Link to MASI 1.1 Contrary to EOC 
Mandate 
Implicit Control 4 
E20 MRTO Team Restricted by CG-9333 Implicit Control 5 
E21 
CG-761/CG-741 Do not Approve MASI 2.0 Functional 
Requirements 
Implicit Capacity 4 
E22 
Conflict Over FRD 1.1 Content Between CG-7 and CG-
9333 Further Delays Creation of System Level 
Requirements 
Implicit Control 5 
E23 C4IT-SC Brief: WK/MASI Concerns Implicit Control 3 















WK Does not Utilize MASI 1.2 for WK State of the Port 
(SOP) Contrary to EOC Mandate 
Implicit Capacity 4 
E26 Change of CG-9333 PM Implicit Control 5 
E27 
MASI Development Team Begins RAD/JAD 
Methodology 
Implicit Control 4 
E28 
Status Brief to Assistant Commandant for U.S. 
Coast Guard Capability (CG-7 RDML) 
Implicit Control 3 
E29 MRTO Staffing Issues/MRTO Extension Implicit Capacity 3 
E30 
CG-9333 Pushes for Fundamental Changes in 
WK/MASI Interconnection (Object Level Linkage) 
Implicit Control 6 
E31 MASI 2.0 Non-delivery to WK for Integration Implicit Control 7 
E32 
CG-9333 Directs WK/MASI Technical Interface 
Meetings be Delayed Until December 2012 
Implicit Capacity 5 




E34 MASI Status Brief to RDML (CG-7) and SES (CG-6) Implicit Capacity 5 
E35 
CG-9333, CG-741, and CG-761 Hold "Simple 
Scheduler" Meetings Without Notifying OSC 
Implicit Control 6 
E36 

















RDML CG-7 Memo: MASI No Longer to Provide Any 
Functionality for WK 
Explicit   8 





Loss of 55 Percent of MASI Team Over Four Months, 
Including Technical Lead and Senior Developer 
Implicit Capacity 8 





The event matrix diagram (Figure 19) illustrates event dependencies. The 
diagram is temporal, and time advances down and to the right. Specific dates are 
less important than the sequence of events, but the dates are listed in Appendix 
A. The event in any given row has a dependency upon marked events in the 
columns. An example narrative description of event flow and dependency as 
shown in the matrix is given in Chapter IV, Section G. Due to the number of 
events, the matrix is cumbersome to interpret. Figures 20 and 21 map the events 
to an event-on-node diagram which reveals several insights concerning the data. 
These insights were used in formation of propositions discussed following the 
diagram. 
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Figure 19.  Event Matrix Diagram 
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Figure 20.  Event Flow Diagram Part 1 
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Figure 21.  Event Flow Diagram Part 2 
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A cursory view of the events list reveals 15 percent of the issues were 
explicit, while 85 percent were implicit. Of the implicit events, 47.5 percent were 
control related, 22.5 percent were capacity related, and 15 percent related to 
funding priorities. From the event matrix diagram, dependency percentages were 
calculated as shown in Table 3. The relation of event and dependency 
percentages is shown in Figure 22. Implicit control issues dominate in both event 
and dependency percentages, but the dependency percentage also increases 
from the event percentages at the expense of the other categories. Although 
control is most frequently exercised, implicit funding priorities have the highest 
average severity. The event-on-node diagram, in combination with event 
descriptions (Appendix A), and project narratives, revealed the propositions 
discussed in the next sections. 




Control Capacity Funding Priority
Number of Events 6 19 9 6
Percentage of Total Events 15.00% 47.50% 22.50% 15.00%
Average Severity 5.5 5.26 5 6.33
Number of Dependencies 35 169 59 26
Percentage of Dependencies 12.11% 58.48% 20.42% 9.00%
Explicit
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Figure 22.  Percentage Comparison of Events and Dependencies 
As the event matrix was mapped to the event-on-node diagram, 
commonalities became apparent. Groups of primary actors emerged and are 
represented in the diagram swimlanes. The OSC MASI development team was 
comprised of the SDA and SSA for MASI, as well as the development team. The 
OSC MASI requirements team (MRTO), was initially created to decompose high 
level IOC WK IOP requirements to the system level for use by MASI developers. 
The C3CEN development team contained the SDA for WatchKeeper, along with 
government and contractor developers. The CG-9333 acquisition team included 
mid-level acquisition managers and IOC WK specific requirements personnel. 
The OSC, C3CEN, and CG-9333 swimlanes represent clear clans from the 
control perspective, as well as organizations with separate capacity concerns. 
The “Senior Leader Decisions” lane included joint senior leadership meetings 
where decisions were made concerning the IT programs. An example of a senior 
leadership group with decision-making authority is the EOC (defined in Chapter 
III, Section B.5). 
An extremely influential subgroup, however, is not explicitly present on the 
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over every swimlane. The group is middle management (defined in Chapter III, 
Section G), and they were present in all headquarters directorates, ostensibly 
acting on behalf of the O-6 directors. Middle managers were deeply involved 
representing CG-761, CG-741, CG-633, and CG-9333. They also represented 
individual clans from a control perspective, were often at odds, and formed 
shifting alliances in efforts to achieve their clan goals. Ideally, the overarching 
IOC implementation goal would have overridden clan boundaries and directorate 
power concerns, but this was not the case. As LaSalle pointed out specifically 
regarding WatchKeeper: 
The information that was passed to the decision-makers [by HQ 
middle managers] was often a more positive perspective than 
reality. No group was willing to be responsible for the failure of the 
project. Milestone deliverables and expectations were all managed 
in a way that would present the organizing group in the best light. 
From a program management perspective, it was very difficult to 
gauge the true pulse of the project given these realities. (2013, p. 
52) 
When the program experienced difficulties, clan delineations took precedence, 
rather than the portfolio goals. The effect of middle management is further 
detailed in the following sections as well as in event descriptions in Appendix A. 
C. PROPOSITIONS ON ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY AND PROJECT 
EXECUTION 
1. Proposition A: In the absence of clear tracking mechanisms, 
implicit capacity issues are very difficult to understand, resulting in 
systemic over-commitment of personnel and resources in complex 
organizations. 
2. Proposition B: Firefighting is a common indicator of capacity 
issues, which can be incorrectly perceived as a project-level, rather 
than an organization-level, problem.  
3. Proposition C: Systematic mechanisms for understanding and 
mitigating capacity problems at an organizational level are critical to 
avoid compounding project delays and portfolio impact. 
Regarding IT portfolio management in complex organizations, capacity 
issues are typically hidden and easily misdiagnosed based on presentation of 
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associated signs and symptoms (Chapter II Section D.3.a). As complexity in a 
system increases, so do the number of possible causes for an undesirable event. 
A project milestone could be missed for many reasons within a small team: 
shifting requirements, equipment or software licensing delays, and unforeseen 
developmental issues. As program scope increases, several teams may be 
involved, adding to the list of possible causes: failure of other departments to 
meet their obligations, delay of important joint decisions, scheduling conflicts 
between groups, etc. Unfortunately, as higher management attempts to 
determine root cause, teams begin to consolidate along clan lines, obfuscating 
the effort in a desire not to be perceived as the cause. Indeed, if a group actually 
was the cause of the miss, they may legitimately believe the cause lies 
elsewhere, due to the difficulty of perceiving capacity issues.  
In addition, reporting of events is often diffused by levels of hierarchy 
within organizations. A contracted development team may report to a manager, 
who then reports to the contract representative, who then addresses the 
customer for whom a milestone has been missed. The contract representative 
may be justifiably reluctant to report information which reflects negatively on their 
group. An analogous case within an organization (rather than a contractor), is 
middle management reporting to senior management. To further complicate 
matters, it is common to deny capacity related issues until they have become 
critical.  
Project teams are typically highly motivated in the initial stages of project 
development and coding. They have a positive attitude and enthusiastically 
approach problem solving. At the team level, missing minor goals from day to 
day or week to week can be mitigated through shuffling the local schedule, 
applying more local resources to an issue, working longer hours, or 
compromising quality for a quicker solution. Efforts at this level are typically not 
reported to higher level managers, and in the example of a contract team, the 
contract representative does not report any issue to the customer because the 
problems at this point are contained. The middle manager does not report to their 
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superior for the same reason. Thus, the eventual failure to meet a milestone may 
be the culmination of several events, which are only partially understood at 
higher levels. Certainly the discussion of whether or not there is a fundamental 
capacity problem in some areas may never be contemplated. 
In the WK and MASI case study, capacity issues were experienced by all 
groups in Figures 20 and 21 at various points. CG-761, CG-741, and CG-633 
(HQ) experienced significant organizational level capacity issues and firefighting 
at the middle management level. The middle managers were each involved in 
work for multiple projects when MASI and WK alone required a full time effort 
(Proposition A). In this case, firefighting syndrome effects spread from these 
directorates and affected MASI development in particular. Events E10, E18, E21, 
E22, and E27 were all affected by capacity issues in these directorates. Creation 
of the MRTO team (E10) was necessary because the above directorates were 
unable to generate requirements in a timely manner (one of CG-741’s primary 
duties, facilitated by the CG-761 sponsor’s representative). The requirements 
generated by MRTO and the MASI development team, however, required 
specific approval by CG-761 and CG-741, which was delayed by firefighting on 
other programs and resulted in E21 (a delay of two months and churn by the 
MASI team). The effort of E27 was hampered for the same reason. MASI 1.1 
SDLC documentation (E18) was unavailable due to CG-633 capacity issues, and 
was delayed by 5 months.  
As indicated in Proposition B, senior leaders noticed MASI development 
was behind schedule and assumed the fault was with the OSC MASI team, 
rather than recognizing HQ capacity issues as a fundamental cause. The author 
assumes similar negative effects were seen in the other projects overseen by 
these individuals (due to their firefighting involving WK and MASI) but does not 
have specific data. Thus the capacity issues persisted throughout the program’s 
duration and propagated to infect other programs in the portfolio, both directly 
and indirectly (Proposition C).  
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The OSC MASI development team did actively attempt to mitigate 
capacity issues in 2010 and 2011, but their options were limited and they did not 
receive support from senior leadership (Proposition A). Following event E11, the 
team immediately recognized they would be unable to meet the deadlines 
imposed given the limitations placed upon them. Having their projected schedule 
shortened by 33 percent and denied additional resources, they worked to reduce 
the scope of the project (according to the project management triangle, seen in 
Figure 4). They repeatedly briefed senior leadership and middle management 
regarding the capacity issues they faced, and were eventually successful in 
reducing program scope, but the success was largely negated by the unresolved 
HQ capacity issues mentioned above, and exacerbated by the imposition of 
significant additional work (E12). MASI implementation was negatively impacted 
by the decisions of senior leaders who largely refused to support capacity 
mitigation efforts (Proposition C). 
Active vigilance is required to detect capacity issues. Immediately upon 
initial identification of what is perceived as a capacity problem, an evaluation 
should take place to determine if the issue is at a project or organizational level. 
The true cause should be sought, not to be confused with the visible signs and 
symptoms of the immediate problem. Definitive action must take place to either 
resolve the capacity issue (additional funding/personnel) or to adjust stakeholder 
expectations (schedule versus quality and functionality). If this does not happen, 
the capacity issue becomes worse, firefighting can commence if not already 
present, and schedule slips will broaden and increase to include affecting the 
schedules of dependent portfolio projects (Section F, Proposition A). Project plan 
dates become essentially meaningless in this environment, which is very 
important if other projects depend on your schedule (as was the case with MASI). 
If the problem is organizational firefighting, the project itself may be 
fundamentally sound (which was not the case with WK), and the schedule 
realistic, provided the firefighting problem is isolated from the project and dealt 
with separately by the organization. 
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D. PROPOSITIONS ON ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL MECHANISMS 
AND PROJECT EXECUTION 
1. Proposition A: In the absence of a clearly understood set of 
control mechanisms, the potential implicit control factor impact 
increases with organizational complexity. 
2. Proposition B: Middle management perception of executive 
portfolio strategy is often limited, leaving them to utilize clan control 
mechanisms and unknowingly creating goal divergence. 
3. Proposition C: Prudent use of implicit control by senior managers 
can greatly increase the chance of success and bridge clan divides. 
Unless senior managers understand and plan for the impact of implicit 
control factors, they may discover they have lost effective control of their own 
program. With multiple levels of hierarchy, and the presence of several peer-level 
organizations, several clans (from a control perspective) will exist. With 
insufficiently defined explicit organizational controls, the available space for clan 
control to operate increases. People tend to act along clan lines, with portfolio 
concerns secondary. As Elonen and Artto (2003) note, project managers are 
often forced to utilize implicit control to secure resources for their project to the 
potential detriment of the portfolio. This is where middle managers wield their 
influence. They have enough power to materially influence the course of a 
project, and the wherewithal to disguise this from senior managers. If the senior 
manager does not firmly exercise explicit control, or utilize implicit control to 
his/her advantage, the middle managers may stray. 
Although the CG is a military organization, with the accompanying 
hierarchy, IT portfolio development has consistently experienced control 
problems both vertically and across peer directorates. One senior leader 
commented that with so many directorates possessing veto power over the 
others, it was amazing anything was ever completed. Ostensibly, CG-6, CG-7, 
and CG-9 are peers, as explained in Chapter III. The COEs (OSC, C3CEN, and 
TISCOM) are peers with each other, under the CG-6 C4IT SC. In addition to the 
hierarchy described above, peers were implied by military rank. The WK EOC  
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was comprised of O-6’s from CG-633, CG-761, CG-741, CG-9333, OSC and 
C3CEN, among others. In this sense, OSC and C3CEN were both peers to CG-
633 and subordinate to CG-6. 
The formal control structure above inherently allows peer-to-peer implicit 
control issues when viewed in combination with their interleaved missions and 
responsibilities (Proposition A). In a complex program such as WK, formal control 
was further blurred (vertically) because CG-9 directed the development efforts of 
C3CEN, a CG-6 entity. WK program size and complexity increased control 
challenges. Development was geographically and organizationally distributed 
among various directorates and contractors. Lack of overall clear control 
mechanisms allowed dramatic influence from implicit control factors, as 
evidenced by the domination of implicit control dependencies seen over other 
factors in Figure 22 (Proposition A).  
Peer implicit control factors were based on organizational hierarchical 
levels and military rank. Directorate leaders and senior peers influenced each 
other (events E8, E16, E23, E24, E26, E33 and E40). Middle managers at CG-
633, CG-761, CG-741, and CG-9333 influenced each other (events E12–E14, 
E19–E22, E24, E30, E33, and E37). C3CEN and OSC cooperated at the lower 
levels, while their O-6 commanding officers interacted laterally at the senior level. 
Implicit control actions were overwhelmingly motivated along clan affiliations 
(described in Chapter IV, Section B) but often involved program and portfolio-
wide consequences which were not necessarily intended by the originating clan 
(Proposition B). 
An example originating with CG-9333 illustrates both horizontal and 
vertical implicit control, with unintended portfolio consequence. Events E13, E14, 
and E22 illustrate events where CG-9333 middle management attempted to 
control MASI requirements generation (lateral implicit control enabled in 
accordance with Proposition A). Their initial efforts resulted in limited control of 
MASI activity, although they did cause MASI delays. With the departure of the 
CG-9333 PM (E26), their middle management influenced the incoming, 
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inexperienced PM (vertical control), which allowed them to introduce E30 and 
E35, even though E30 was contrary to the directions of the prior PM. CG-9333 
middle management desired control of MASI fulfillment of WK IOP functionality. 
When they did not obtain it to their satisfaction, they attempted to remove MASI 
as a requirement for WK IOP, which they were successful in doing (E37). As a 
result, C3CEN was forced to create an inferior (and largely manual) IOP solution, 
which fulfilled less than one fourth of the requirements MASI would have 
provided (Proposition B). 
Creation of this solution impacted completion of other WK development, 
and was a critical influence to the cessation of MASI development (E40). During 
this time, the CG-761 director, secure in his explicit control, committed additional 
funds to MASI (E38) and ordered his middle managers to secure further funding. 
Contrary to his wishes, the middle managers advised the EOC to cease MASI 
development. Had the CG-761 director been aware of the implicit control 
struggles taking place around him, he may have been able to achieve his goal 
rather than being marginalized (Proposition C). Cardinal, (2001; Cardinal et al., 
2004) and Kirsch (1997, 2004) argue clan control can complement formal control, 
and had he been aware, he could have used this to his advantage, both vertically 
and with his peers. CG-9333 middle management believed they were acting in 
the best interest of WK (Proposition B), and the result was a less capable tool 
and additional consumption of C3CEN development resources. 
Developing a complex program across multiple organizations in the 
absence of sufficient control mechanisms allowed extensive influence by implicit 
control brokers. These middle managers, however, did not understand and 
support the portfolio view, and were susceptible to clan mentality. They 
attempted to optimize locally for their clan at the expense of the higher program 
and portfolio. The result was damage to their program, as well as to MASI. 
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E. PROPOSITIONS ON ORGANIZATIONAL FUNDING PRIORITIES AND 
PROJECT EXECUTION 
1. Proposition A: When funding priorities are not clarified adequately, 
ad hoc decisions regarding one project can adversely spread to 
others in the portfolio. 
2. Proposition B: Periodic assessment and recognition of funding 
vulnerabilities should take place at the portfolio level to ensure 
minimized negative portfolio-wide impact. 
3. Proposition C: Following identification, realistic assessment of 
funding priorities at the project level must inform timely changes to 
scope, schedule, and quality. 
IT portfolio funding requirements are dynamic. Multi-year projects 
attributed annual funding amounts experience unforeseen issues which may 
require additional funding or modification of project timelines and scope. When a 
major development program experiences significant upheaval, an analysis of 
portfolio impact should be performed in addition to program review. Enterprise IT 
systems have direct and indirect effect on other programs in the portfolio. 
The MASI program was vulnerable to funding priorities from inception. 
CG-9333 managers initially chose MHS-Ops as an existing solution they believed 
would be usable at an enterprise level (E2). CG-6 identified MHS-Ops security 
vulnerabilities and mandated the program be re-written (E3). At this time, CG-6 
should have identified funding in accordance with SDLC requirements. They did 
not realize, however, the scope of the project and proceeded without identifying 
sufficient funding in violation of the SDLC. Funding pressure directly affected 
schedules and design choices throughout. In 2011, in particular, funding priorities 
caused non-replacement of departing engineers. This fundamental vulnerability 
was fatal when WK realized they had funding troubles of their own for 2012, and 
competed with MASI to obtain them. Portfolio funding issues affected both MASI 
and WK as detailed below. 
In July 2010, the CG-9333 PM realized the program possessed excess 
expiring funds which would have been wasted if unused. He wanted to maximize 
the value the funds could provide both to WK and other programs in the portfolio. 
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He polled the other programs providing direct or indirect services for WK, and 
determined whether they were experiencing funding shortages. The connection 
to MASI was direct, in that MASI was to provide WK IOP functionality. The PM 
funded the MRTO team (E10) and the MASI team for a portion of 2011 (E16). 
They also provided funding to the Enterprise Geographic Information System 
(EGIS). In that case, WK was one consumer of GIS data feeds which were also 
needed by several other portfolio systems, not directly linked to EGIS. These 
programs also benefited. Timely identification was critical to the responsible and 
effective allocation of the surplus funds in a manner where the benefit to the 
portfolio was maximized. It should be noted that the method followed by the CG-
9333 PM to identify programs to benefit from the WK funding surplus was 
informal. He contacted the WK SSA located at OSC and inquired. In this case of 
surplus funds, priority goal ambiguity was not an issue, but ideally more formal 
routes would exist for CG-9333 to provide direct funding to CG-6 programs. 
Funding deficits are more common than surpluses, and much more 
difficult and contentious, to mitigate. When CG-9333 provided 2011 funds for 
MASI development (E16) they stated no additional funding would be available in 
2012. At the time, identified annual MASI funding was less than one third what 
development required. In April 2011, the OSC MASI team began briefing senior 
leaders on the fiscal 2012 funding shortage (six months prior to the start of fiscal 
year 2012). As noted in E24, CG-6 and CG-7 focused on creation of alternative 
plans rather than identifying funding sources. This approach was a viable method 
given lack of visibility on funding in general due to the federal continuing 
resolutions experienced during the year.  
In October 2011, non-delivery of MASI 2.0 (E31) was not a surprise, given 
schedule extensions had been requested of senior leadership in June 2011. 
Given unknown 2012 funding, MASI development goals should have been 
altered in the second half of 2011 (Proposition C). A reduction in scope would 
have allowed fielding of a reduced system in 2011 in the event 2012 funding was 
not forthcoming. Lack of meaningful focus on identification of funding led to E33, 
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direct competition for funds between WK and MASI (Proposition A). Certainly at 
this point the portfolio view should have been considered (Proposition B). WK 
required MASI to supply IOP functionality, and non-funding of MASI would hurt 
WK. The two systems competing for funds was entirely nonsensical, yet each 
side (CG-9333 versus CG-7/CG-6) felt they would be the beneficiary, and 
alternative funding was not seriously sought until December 2011. WK was a 
congressionally mandated system, and received the 2012 funding. 
Non-delivery of MASI 2.0, and lack of identified funding, led the CG-9333 
PM to explore alternatives to MASI (E35) which he was then approved to 
implement (E37). Although CG-761 provided interim funding in January 2012, to 
fund the MASI team until the end of February (E38), it was too late (Proposition 
A). The lack of visibility and conflict with CG-9333 crippled the MASI team, and 
55 percent of the OSC team departed (E39). Continued MASI development was 
no longer practical and the team was dissolved (E40). Although senior leaders 
were aware of funding issues with MASI and WK, they did not meaningfully 
intervene or identify alternate funding in a timely manner. Furthermore, they did 
nothing to reduce the scope of MASI in 2011 to allow fielding of a reduced 
system (Proposition C).  
F. COMPOUNDING COMPLEXITY: FACTOR INTERACTION AND 
CONTAGION 
1. Proposition A: As IT portfolio complexity increases, so does the 
episodic possibility of contagion, amplified by insufficient funding 
clarity, unresolved capacity problems, and unregulated clan control 
issues. 
2. Proposition B: Lack of explicit organizational controls and periodic 
executive attunement to implicit factors, allows excessive latitude in 
middle manager’s project influence, which may be clan-oriented 
and contrary to portfolio goals. 
3. Proposition C: Perception of the periodic influence of 
organizational factors by portfolio executives is insufficient: In the 
absence of timely mitigation efforts, minor contagions may 
compound and amplify, resulting in project cancellations and 
adverse portfolio impact. 
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Throughout the analysis in this chapter, the examples cited have shown 
that as complexity increases (complex network problem), so does the potential 
for negative effects to the program (schedule, cost, and scope) as well as to the 
overall portfolio. Analysis of each implicit factor in the preceding sections was 
difficult to present without referencing the contributions of the other factors 
because they tend to reinforce each other and propagate throughout the project, 
program, and portfolio. The result of a series of effects can be difficult to predict, 
and difficult to analyze, even with the benefit of hindsight. Effects not only amplify 
and propagate, they can damage the source program as well as the infected one 
(reciprocal effects). 
As noted in Chapter II, Section E, Allen and Gale (2000) discuss the 
theory of small financial sector shocks spreading to larger areas by contagion. 
Shaver (2006) referenced increased vulnerability to shocks due to increased 
interdependencies of merged businesses. The analogous situation occurred with 
WK and MASI. Each was a complex system dependent on the other. MASI was 
to provide WK IOP functionality, although it was also a separate enterprise 
system supporting a non-WK user group. OSC and C3CEN were expected to 
develop interoperability and data sharing between the two systems. CG-9333 
and MRTO teams were dependent on each other for program requirements. WK 
was tied financially to MASI via CG-9333 funding in 2011, and competition for 
funds in 2012 (Proposition A). The EOC group was comprised of several peer 
directorates, who made communal decisions. Lack of well understood 
organizational controls and insufficient senior leadership action allowed middle 
managers with provincial views to make critical decisions (Proposition B). Senior 
leadership acknowledgement of implicit factors was insufficient to halt contagion 
(Proposition C). The complex interaction between groups and the contagion 
involving implicit factors combined to eventually result in cessation of MASI 
development (E40), and the waste of nearly seven million dollars (explained in 
detail throughout Appendix A).  
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One specific example of contagion began with C3CEN, but was itself 
influenced by CG-9333. C3CEN was a group with persistent and largely 
unrecognized, or uncontrolled capacity issues. See Appendix A for detailed event 
descriptions which complement this narration. Events E6, E15, E25, and E32 
touch on C3CEN’s capacity issues. E6 was an early indicator to senior 
leadership that C3CEN was experiencing serious development issues, but the 
focus was release of WK as a technical demonstrator without recognition of 
fundamental capacity issues (capacity Proposition A). Continuing capacity issues 
resulted in E15, non-delivery of the WK AMT tool to MASI, which required it in 
order to develop the user identification and authentication module. 
Event E15 also provides an excellent example of firefighting. The AMT 
tool was delayed for 10 months, and finally delivered with minimal, insufficient 
functionality (classic firefighting symptoms). The ongoing delays were a result of 
CG-9333 middle management continually re-assigning C3CEN developers to put 
out other fires within the program. The delays of E32 were the result of a CG-
9333 prioritization which was necessary because C3CEN had missed delivery on 
a WK service pack. As fundamental capacity issues remained unaddressed, 
C3CEN entered firefighting syndrome and remained there for the duration of the 
program.  
CG-9333, CG-761, and CG-741 middle management obfuscated the 
severity of the problem (Proposition B), and C3CEN experienced continued 
incremental schedule slips, down-scoping of functionality, and the MASI 
schedule was adversely affected many times due to dependencies on C3CEN 
which were missed (Proposition A). See Appendix A for further specific impact 
descriptions. In this case of firefighting, the capacity issue was within the WK 
program. The program was so large that firefighting was able to take place 
among the various WK groups, but it also infected C3CEN programs outside of 
WK and became an organizational problem (Proposition A). Specifically, 
resources were taken from the C3CEN Search and Rescue Optimal Planning  
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System (SAROPS) team to work on WK fires. The author does not have data on 
the extent to which other C3CEN programs were affected by WK induced 
firefighting. 
Although senior leaders certainly understood C3CEN was experiencing 
significant problems, they continually attempted to mitigate the specific signs and 
symptoms, rather than addressing fundamental capacity issues. WK capacity 
issues became a source of contagion to other portfolio programs. Lack of senior 
leadership action (Proposition C), allowed the problem to perpetuate throughout 
the entire program duration, resulting in the situation warned of by Bohn and 
Jaikumar: “the pressure of a backlog of unsolved problems leads engineers to 
solve problems not just inefficiently, but badly. As a result, each problem 
supposedly solved has a chance of creating a new problem, and sometimes 
more than one” (2000, p. 16).  
Full, in-depth narrative of the events in Figures 20 and 21 is not practical, 
but section G below illustrates the complex interaction of only the first seven 
events. The description for these events is the most simple available for the 
program overall. They pre-date MRTO, CG-9333 requirements problems, and 
funding issues, but even absent these influences the complexity is apparent. 
G. RECIPROCAL AND REINFORCING EFFECTS NARRATIVE: 
CONTAGION 
The IOC WK project began with an impression of being behind schedule 
(organizational slack was eliminated before the project began). The SAFE port 
act (2006) required IOC establishment within three years (by October 2009) yet 
the CG did not receive funds until fiscal year 2008 (14 months after passage of 
the SAFE port act). Definitions of a fully operational IOC were also in flux during 
this time (GAO, 2012). The magnitude of the IOC project was intimidating and 
although the CG had two years from initial appropriations to mandated 
completion, initial decisions were influenced by the sense of time pressure. 
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The pORD (Event 1) was insufficient for developing a system because it 
“only provided a very high-level conceptual need, not system specific 
requirements” (LaSalle, 2013, p. 31) yet this explicit document was the only 
requirements resource available in 2008. WK Segment 1 began development 
with this document as the only guide. Time pressure influenced the selection of 
MHS-Ops (Event 2) as the tool to support the planning and scheduling portion of 
WK (later to be known as IOP functionality). The hope was the MHS-Ops system 
would require only a small amount of work to make it suitable for integration into 
WK (an attempt to conserve capacity while reducing cost and shortening 
implementation time). When security vulnerabilities and other concerns revealed 
MHS-Ops as unsuitable at an enterprise level (indeed, unsuitable for continued 
operation at its current installations) the decision to re-write the tool was made 
and the MASI project was born (Event 3).  
The pORD, however, did not contain sufficient detail to enable meaningful 
requirements for MASI, so the vague goal became to have the new tool emulate 
MHS-Ops but with the added ability of port partner integration functionality 
(though this was only notionally defined as well). Concerns regarding lack of port 
partner related requirements were identified by the OSC MASI team as early as 
January 2009, but prompted no action from senior leaders. Emulating MHS-Ops 
was also a poorly informed decision, because the PM and sponsor were unsure 
the MHS-Ops functionality was suitable for IOC WK integration and functionality, 
due to the lack of detail in the pORD. The method by which the two tools would 
interact and exchange data was undefined but middle managers pressed forward 
(clan control). Thus, the decision to proceed with development based on the 
pORD began the infection of WK which was transmitted to MASI.  
The MASI team, forced to make design decisions in the absence of 
meaningful IOC WK integration requirements, decided to bind their tool to the 
MISLE system rather than creating their own database. This decision (partially 
informed by the HQ implicit control consideration to limit what was viewed at the 
time as a proliferation of new databases) would have far reaching consequences 
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as well. MASI 1.0 was originally scheduled to move to production in December 
2009. In August 2009, TISCOM disqualified the method by which port partners 
were to gain access to MASI, in effect making it useless to WK (Event 4). An 
alternate proposal for port partner access by the MASI team was denied due to 
lack of WK requirements (an implicit control decision by CG-635). Partially due to 
the MASI failure and partially due to other WK development problems, what CG-
9333 desired to be the first production release of WK was deemed insufficient 
(no ATO to be granted). The program was forced to deploy only as a “technical 
demonstrator” (7 months after the date mandated by the SAFE port act) without 
planning and scheduling functionality (Event 6). 
Having failed to enable port partner functionality, MASI 1.0 was tested at 
Sector Seattle in July 2010 to determine if it could replace MHS-Ops for CG use. 
Although introduction of a new tool to replace a well-liked tool is challenging, 
MASI 1.0 failed in its test deployment largely due to issues created by its close 
coupling with the MISLE system (Event 7). MASI 1.0 was never officially released 
on the recommendation of HQ middle management. 
The decision to begin with the pORD as the primary source of 
requirements infected both the initial WK and MASI development efforts. In 
conjunction with perceived time constraints, this resulted in the essential failure 
of the initial version of both tools. This is an example of a reciprocal effect, where 
insufficient WK requirements contributed to MASI 1.0 failure, which then 
contributed to the WK failure to obtain an ATO. The impact to the MASI team 
was severe as well. MASI 1.0 was generally considered a technically sound tool, 
which was well implemented, but built with what turned out in hindsight to be 
incorrect requirements. Twenty months of full team development were perceived 
as largely wasted and morale on the team suffered greatly. Although the ORD 
was finished in March 2010, and was much more robust than the pORD, it was 
also a high-level conceptual document (Event 5). 
  94 
Several other examples of adverse reciprocal and reinforcing effects may 
be sussed out from the descriptions in Appendix A, in conjunction with Figures 20 
and 21. 
H. SUMMARY 
This chapter, in conjunction with Appendix A, forms the bulk of the WK 
and MASI case study analysis. Specific examples were given to support the 
assertion that WK was a program which experienced significant problems 
spanning the time frame of the study. The analysis of events, including the event 
matrix diagram and event flow diagram, were explained and detailed. Relevant 
statistics were presented, revealing significant effect from implicit factors, and 
several themes emerged. The themes were organized into propositions 
regarding capacity, control, funding priorities, and their interaction. Finally, the 
first seven events were explained in a narrative style to illustrate an example of 
factor interaction, and reciprocal effects. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Information Technology (IT) projects have a well-documented potential for 
complexity, difficulty, and failure. This thesis utilized a case study to demonstrate 
success or failure depends not only on the individual project but also on the 
dynamic interaction of organizational factors at the portfolio level. With MASI 1.1, 
the OSC development team achieved success by creating a tool that not only 
served the mission needs of its user base, but was also well-liked and easy to 
use. The team won the OSC “Team of the Quarter” award for its efforts (detailed 
in Appendix C). Yet this same team failed to deliver MASI 2.0 on schedule and 
saw all development discontinued. The difference in the efforts was the 
increasing entanglement and dependency upon the unhealthy WK program in 
conjunction with organizational factors limiting time, scope, and quality. 
Enterprise IT projects are not developed in a vacuum, and WK problems infected 
MASI as well as other systems in the portfolio. 
Through event analysis, several themes emerged which emphasize the 
potential impact of implicit factors on portfolio programs, particularly in and 
among complex organizations. The recommendations below put forth strategies 
to help prevent and mitigate undesirable shocks to the portfolio from the factors 
discussed, as well as how to identify their effects and limit their influence. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS: MANAGING ORGANIZATIONAL FACTORS 
FOR PORTFOLIO SUCCESS 
Large organizations and the accompanying enterprise IT architecture 
which complements its business goals, continue to increase in complexity. 
Awareness of organizational factors which affect the IT portfolio is increasingly 
critical, yet awareness alone is insufficient. Table 4 selects a key 
recommendation for each implicit factor for three broad levels of hierarchy: 
Senior leaders, middle managers, and project managers. The sections below 
elaborate on the recommendations. 
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Table 4.   Recommendations: Managing Organizational Factors 
For Portfolio Success 
 
 
1. Systematic mechanisms for understanding and mitigating 
capacity problems at an organizational level are critical to 
avoid compounding project delays and portfolio impact. 
Senior Leaders: Due to the invisible nature of capacity issues, 
recognition can be difficult. When the portfolio is healthy, actively guard against 
capacity issues. Perform a portfolio review prior to approving commencement of 
large new projects. This will not only identify possible overlap of a new system 
with existing ones, but will also show the current status and staffing profiles of 
existing projects. Be vigilant for signs of organizational firefighting, particularly 
following commencement of new projects or when experiencing an influx of work. 
Dashboard style reporting systems favored by senior leaders are helpful, but 
depend on input from both middle managers and project leaders. Create a non-
punitive reporting atmosphere to encourage honest reporting from middle 
managers. Transparency in leadership is critical, and the development 
organization should periodically receive training to enhance understanding of 
organizational goals. Do not force project managers to eliminate all slack time 
from project plans. Do not expect to force changes to an aspect of the project 
management triangle (scope, funding, or schedule) without allowing 
corresponding shift of the other elements. Organizational firefighting syndrome is 
Recommendations for
Capacity Control Funding Priorities
Senior Leaders
Complete a portfolio review 
prior to large influxes of 
work
Create a non-punitive vertical 
reporting structure and cultivate 
both vertical and horizontal 
implicit control networks to 
supplement explicit authority
Clear communication and 
transparency should accompany 
timely prioritization decisions
Middle Managers
Actively seek out and 
report firefighting trends
Understand and align with 
portfolio goals, providing 
honest vertical reporting
Resist local continuation 




project problems and 
organizational firefighting
Be aware of implicit control 
networks, and utilize them when 
necessary to further 
organizational goals
Provide honest milestone 
reporting and expect timely 
notification of prioritization 
decisions
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difficult to mitigate when in progress. Bohn and Jaikumar (2000) detail tactical 
and strategic changes for immediate, short term mitigation, but cultural changes 
are typically required for eliminating the problem and preventing recurrence. In 
the thesis case study, cultural elimination of slack time, and constant budget 
slashing to obtain short-term savings, contributed to long term capacity issues. 
Middle Management: Consolidate reports from project managers, 
actively searching for insufficient capacity or firefighting trends. Report problems 
without fear of repercussion. Particular attention should be exercised in cases 
where personnel are being removed from projects under development to take on 
new work. Understand portfolio goals and resist local optimization at the expense 
of the portfolio. Expect meaningful intervention and prioritization from senior 
leaders. Do not force removal of slack time from project manager plans. 
Project Manager: Differentiate between project problems and 
organizational capacity issues. Report issues to middle management in a timely 
manner and expect meaningful intervention. Clearly document project delays 
believed to have been caused by capacity issues or organizational firefighting. 
Insert reasonable slack time into project plans and expect support from middle 
management. 
2. Prudent use of implicit control by senior managers can greatly 
increase the chance of success and bridge clan divides. 
Senior Leaders: Do not discount the importance of implicit control 
networks. It may be tempting to dismiss implicit control concerns as “playing 
politics,” but this is not the case. Foster creation of implicit control networks with 
fellow senior leaders and middle management of parallel organizations 
(departments or units) to unofficially bridge clan divides. Seek to use implicit 
control to supplement explicit hierarchical authority, and as a method to receive 
reports on portfolio health outside of official channels. Create a forum where 
middle management can discuss portfolio goals without repercussion, to 
encourage honest reporting and exploration of ideas. Implicit control should not 
imply duplicity or deception, but is merely an alternate or supplemental method to 
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achieve organizational goals. A senior leader who utilizes both explicit and 
implicit control has an advantage over those who don’t. 
Middle Management: Seek understanding of the portfolio and 
organizational goals, and help ensure alignment with projects. Discuss perceived 
gaps with senior leaders and provide supporting evidence. Do not use implicit 
control to implement an agenda contrary to the policies of the organization 
(department or unit). 
Project Manager: Be aware of implicit control networks. Support and 
understand organizational goals. Seek to officially work through middle managers 
and direct superiors, but maintain alternate unofficial lines of communication with 
senior leaders when possible. A redundant implicit control network can work to 
minimize the adverse effects of an incompetent middle manager. 
3. Following identification, realistic assessment of funding 
priorities at the project level must inform timely changes to 
scope, schedule, and quality. 
Senior Leaders: When creating funding priorities, avoid favoritism and 
promote transparency. Sound funding priorities should be defensible under 
scrutiny and align with organizational goals and the overall IT architecture. No 
project should be considered “too big to fail.” Ensure program milestones are 
meaningfully met. When possible, resolve funding priorities expediently. Do not 
allow a project to continue at unsustainable levels when further funding is not 
available. If projects must be truncated or cancelled, timely notification allows for 
graceful project resolution and archiving of data for possible future use. 
Middle Management: Do not obfuscate or alter project reports to senior 
leaders to disguise problems. Provide honest evaluations of projects, particularly 
at critical milestones. Timely identification of unhealthy projects allows for 
thoughtful mitigation and prioritization. When a project must be downsized or 
altered, report the information in a timely manner to the project manager. Allow 
time for project members to seek reassignment within the organization, if 
possible. Do not be tempted to identify local methods to enable project 
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continuance without approval from senior leaders in accordance with 
organizational goals. 
Project Manager: Support project status reports and milestones faithfully. 
Do not attempt to manipulate data or figures to shelter a specific project or 
development team. Resist clan control at the expense of portfolio goals. 
Unhealthy projects must be identified in order to assess their continued value to 
the portfolio. Expect timely and honest feedback from middle managers 
regarding project status in the portfolio. 
4. Summary 
An experienced leader may argue many of the recommendations are not 
always possible or practical to implement. A situation, in which total alignment 
exists from senior leader to the engineer working on a project, is rare. 
Transparency through levels of hierarchy is beneficial to promoting 
understanding of organizational goals, but is rarely understood by all. A complex 
organization may not explicitly afford an individual at a certain level of hierarchy 
to implement sweeping changes (at this point, faithful readers of the thesis 
should be considering implicit control networks). If nothing else, awareness of the 
effect of organizational factors on IT portfolio management and development will 
aid a good manager or leader in performance of their duties, and in the guidance 
of those below them. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE USCG 
Implementation of the recommendations proposed in Section A would 
benefit the CG, but additional specific actions would also be beneficial. 
An extensive review of the SDLC and MSAM/SELC processes, along with 
clarification of responsibilities between CG-6 and CG-9 would help limit the 
influence of implicit factors. The processes were designed to aid implementation 
and lifecycle management of quality IT systems, but are only meaningful when 
followed. As evidenced by event E18, statements regarding obfuscated 
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milestone reporting (LaSalle, 2013), and various requirements issues, the SDLC 
and MSAM/SELC processes are often circumvented or marginalized. 
The COEs (particularly OSC and C3CEN) view themselves as individual 
clans, a view which is reinforced when they compete for funds. They have areas 
of overlapping responsibility which have allowed redundant development. 
Individuals working in redundant areas exhibit extreme clan behavior in an effort 
to preserve their positions. Leaders of the COEs resist what they see as loss of 
mission to their rival COE. These attitudes inhibit cooperation and do not support 
portfolio or business goals. One current example is overlap in geographic 
information systems development between OSC and C3CEN. Although the 
COEs were re-organized under the C4IT SC, little meaningful effort has been 
made to bridge the clan divides. Either the COEs should be merged in some 
manner, or their areas of responsibility more clearly separated. This would be a 
contentious process as each COE would resist the changes, but would result in a 
more streamlined and efficient organization. 
The clan problem is also reflected at higher hierarchical levels. As budgets 
continue to shrink, CG-6 and CG-9 have begun to compete for scarce resources. 
This reinforces clan behavior at the expense of the CG mission and IT portfolio. 
Senior management should lead by example in promoting cooperation, rather 
than competition, between directorates. Focus should be placed on 
organizational goals with a supporting IT architecture, not in maintaining 
directorate power and structure at the expense of the mission. A cultural shift to 
realign focus may be necessary. 
Finally, the prevailing attitude in the CG of “doing more with less” is often 
accompanied by capacity issues, decreased product quality, and cost and 
schedule overruns. A more realistic attitude would be to mitigate capacity issues 
by realistically adjusting the amount of work and number of projects in progress 
at any one time. 
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C. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Further studies using the lens of organizational factors and contagion 
theory in IT portfolio development would support the efficacy of the theory, 
particularly studies performed on private sector organizations. 
Related studies which increase the focus on the implicit activities of middle 
managers and associated impacts would increase understanding in this area and 
contribute to the body of knowledge touched on in such works as “In Praise of 
Middle Managers” (2001) and “Emotional Balancing of Organizational Continuity 
and Radical Change: The Contribution of Middle Managers” (2002), both by Quy 
Nguyen Huy. 
An area of research complementary to the framework prevented in this 
thesis involves the study of “tensions.” Organizational factors create tension 
between project and portfolio concerns, as well as management of projects 
versus management of portfolios. Several articles have begun to explore this 
idea, including: “Toward a Theory of Paradox: A Dynamic Equilibrium Model of 
Organizing” (2011) by Smith and Lewis. 
For the CG, according to interviews with several individuals in CG-9333, 
CG-761, CG-633, and C3CEN, the ambiguities between SDLC and major 
acquisitions have not been resolved. The time frame for the thesis case study 
concluded in February 2012, prior to WK final development and production 
release. Further study of the WK program would be pertinent to the issues raised 
in this study. Following WK independence from MASI, did their problems 
continue, and why? Were capacity issues and firefighting addressed? Given its 
limitations, how was the WK system received by end users? A study which 
focused on the capacity and control issues involving C3CEN would be 
illuminating. Such a thesis would form a trilogy of theses involving the WK 
system. LCDR LaSalle (2013) addressed agile development and to a lesser 
extent the HQ middle management perspective, while this thesis addressed 
portfolio concerns and focused on the OSC and MASI perspective. 
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Lessons would also be learned from other long-running and troubled CG 
development projects including the Vessel Documentation System (VDS) which 
took seven years, and the Marine Information for Safety and Law Enforcement 
(MISLE) version 5.0 which has surpassed five years. Preliminary analysis by the 
author suggests they have been negatively affected by implicit organizational 
factors and portfolio issues in a manner similar to WK and MASI but further 
analysis may reveal additional complexities. 
An exhaustive study of both C3CEN and OSC to fully detail areas of 
overlapping development, as well as how conflict and cooperation have affected 
the development of various enterprise systems, would be illuminating. The 
framework developed in this thesis would present an excellent starting point for 
analysis of the two COEs. 
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APPENDIX A. DETAILED WK AND MASI EVENT LIST 
1. E1: IOC WK pORD Published 
 Description: The pORD document was put together by CG-635 and 
CG-761. By design, it provided a notional, very high level 
conceptual need. It was not system specific, and was insufficient for 
system development, yet it was used by WK for exactly this 
purpose due to explicit time constraints. The SAFE Port act of 2006 
mandated IOC establishment within three years, but appropriations 
for the program were not received until 14 months later, creating 
time pressure. 
 Event Type: Explicit 
 Severity: 3 
 Impact: Time: Pressure due to a late start relative to the SAFE Port 
Act requirements (14 months of 3 year period) caused 
commencement of design without proper requirements 
 Occurrence Time Frame: April 2008 
2. E2: MHS-Ops Selected to Fulfill WK IOP Functionality 
 Description: MHS-Ops was a siloed mission and asset scheduling 
system deployed at several CG sectors. The CG-9333 PM hoped 
MHS-Ops could be used by IOC WK with minimal additional 
development work, thus saving time and funds which could be 
applied to other WK functionality. 
 Event Type: Implicit 
 Implicit Category: Funding Priority 
 Severity: 2 
 Impact: Time/Cost Avoidance: Unrealized 
 Occurrence Time Frame: October 2008 
3. E3: Re-write (MASI Creation) and Discontinuation of MHS-Ops 
Mandated. Port Partner Access Critical 
 Description: After a technical evaluation, MHS-Ops was determined 
not only insufficient as an enterprise tool, but a security risk at CG 
locations where it was used. CG-6 prioritized creation of a 
replacement for MHS-Ops for CG users (MASI). Specific written 
requirements did not exist other than to "emulate MHS-Ops" and 
introduce Port Partner access for future WK users. Unfortunately, 
  104 
both proved problematic. Due to the siloed nature of MHS-Ops, it 
had been uniquely modified by each sector at which it was used. 
Methodology to allow Port Partner access was only vaguely defined 
by the pORD. 
 Event Type: Implicit 
 Implicit Category: Control 
 Severity: 5 
 Impact: Time/Cost: Order of magnitude for entire OSC MASI 
development effort was ~$6.5M in just over three years. E2 had 
hoped for minimal cost and MHS-Ops use. The cost does not 
include effort by CG personnel. MASI was not part of the original 
IOC WK plan 
 Occurrence Time Frame: November 2008 
4. E4: MASI 1.0 not Accessible by WK Port Partners 
 Description: Port partner access to MASI was briefed as a high risk 
in January 2009, due to lack of requirements. Under significant 
schedule pressure (motivated by the directive to replace MHS-
Ops), the MASI team designed a Port Partner access solution, 
permission for which was rescinded in August 2009, by TISCOM. 
TISCOM determined port partner access to the CG Data Network 
represented a security risk. The MASI team attempted to salvage 
the situation by moving the system to the DMZ, but this was denied 
by CG-635 (part of an implicit control confrontation with CG-9333), 
also due to lack of requirements. No other solution was practical 
given the December 2009 production release date. MASI 1.0 was 
unsuitable for integration with WK. 
 Event Type: Implicit 
 Implicit Category: Control 
 Severity: 8 
 Impact: Cost: $150k estimated OSC MASI development resource 
wasted on the port partner solution. Critically contributed to E6 
 Occurrence Time Frame: August 2009 
5. E5: IOC ORD Published 
 Description: Although much more robust than the pORD, this 
document also presented high level operational requirements, 
insufficient for system design. The document lists WK “Initial 
Operating Capability” date of Q4, 2011. 
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 Event Type: Explicit 
 Implicit Category: n/a 
 Severity: 3 
 Impact: Time: C3CEN WK development lagging due to prior lack of 
requirements documents 
 Occurrence Time Frame: March 2010 
6. E6: WK Insufficient for Production Release, Approved for 
Release as Technical Demonstrator Instead, without MASI 
 Description: Release as a technical demonstrator was not in the 
WK plan and was a last resort to enable continued deployment 
after an authority to operate (ATO) was denied due to lack of 
functionality. 
Initially, the [WK] developers broke the requirements into three 
spiral deliverables. The first spiral would deliver eight percent of the 
requirements, the second spiral was slotted to deliver 12 percent of 
the requirements, and the third spiral would deliver the remaining 
80 percent of the requirements. After missing the delivery date of 
the first spiral by 114 days, the developers reduced the targeted 
scope by 50 percent and added five additional spiral releases. 
(LaSalle, 2013, p. 52)  
Further, the GAO noted:  
In September 2009, the Coast Guard released initial WatchKeeper 
capabilities to Sector Charleston, South Carolina. However, in 
March 2010, an operational test and evaluation revealed limitations 
in the maturity of the technology. As a result, the Coast Guard 
halted further deployment of WatchKeeper to additional IOC 
locations. In May 2010, DHS authorized the IOC project to release 
WatchKeeper as a technology demonstrator to all 35 IOC locations. 
(2012, p. 18) 
This decision removed many MSAM requirements from WK, but came 
at the expense of reduced funding and operational backlash (LaSalle, 
2013). In reality, the CG had hoped to release WK as a production 
system, but succumbed to the technical demonstrator option under 
pressure from DHS (implicit control). 
 Event Type: Implicit 
 Implicit Category: Control 
 Severity: 4 
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 Impact: Cost: Reduced funding and operational backlash for WK. 
Exact amount of funding reduction unknown, although in the 
millions 
 Occurrence Time Frame: May 2010 
 
7. E7: MASI 1.0 Test Deployment Failure at CG Sector Seattle 
 Description: Following the failure of MASI 1.0 to enable port partner 
access for WK, the pressure to succeed as a replacement for MHS-
Ops in CG use was intense. The July 2010, test deployment to CG 
Sector Seattle was to determine if MASI 1.0 was suitable. The effort 
was a failure on several fronts. In an effort to standardize business 
processes across the CG, CG-761/CG-741 altered them and did 
not inform or prepare users prior to MASI deployment. Users 
expected identical functionality and resented the changes. Critical 
design decisions were made by CG-761/CG-741 which in 
retrospect were ill- advised. MASI 1.0 directly connected to CG 
MISLE in a way which made system use impractical. Although CG-
761/CG-741 could have pressed for release of MASI 1.0 and 
corrected issues in later releases, they labeled the system a failure. 
This frustrated CG-6 because they were under pressure to 
discontinue MHS-Ops. Tension between CG-6 and CG-7 at senior 
levels ensued and implicit control struggles hampered further MASI 
direction and strategy. Although MASI 1.0 was a victim of incorrect 
requirements, the product was technically competent. The 
development team had put forth an incredible effort and the failure 
to release the system drastically lowered team morale. 
 Event Type: Implicit 
 Implicit Category: Control 
 Severity: 8 
 Impact: Cost/Time: OSC MASI team, ~$2M in development wasted 
over 18 months 
 Occurrence Time Frame: July 2010 
8. E8: Executive Oversight Council (EOC) "Getback" Meeting 
 Description: This critical senior level meeting (CG-6, CG-7, CG-
933, OSC, and C3CEN) was in response to the recent failures of 
both WK and MASI. At a high level, several touchpoint events were 
identified between MASI and WK, with projected completion dates. 
Unfortunately, the MASI development team was not consulted prior 
to delivery promises made on its behalf (an event so significant it 
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was separately noted as E11). In addition, the MASI project was 
underfunded, with only 3 months of development funds available for 
2011. The meeting illustrates a significant lack of understanding by 
senior leaders of the complexity and scope of the WK and MASI 
systems, and the complexity of their unresolved dependencies. 
 Event Type: Implicit 
 Implicit Category: Control 
 Severity: 4 
 Impact: Scope/Cost: High level WK/MASI touchpoints scheduled. 
MASI only 25 percent funded for 2011 
 Occurrence Time Frame: October 2010 
9. E9: IOC APG Published 
 Description: The purpose of the Interagency Operations Center 
(IOC) Acquisition Project Guide (APG), written by CG-9333, was to 
define the relationships between WK major project elements. The 
guide also communicated the strategic goals of the project and 
aligned the responsibilities of each project element to those goals. 
Among the glaring omissions from the document are any mentions 
of MASI, or of interoperability, or acknowledgement of OSC as a 
developmental project element. This reflects the explicit disconnect 
between CG-9333 major acquisition processes and CG-6 IT 
processes 
 Event Type: Explicit 
 Implicit Category: n/a 
 Severity: 2 
 Impact: Time: Re-baselined WK timelines according to E8, in 
response to E6 
 Occurrence Time Frame: October 2010 
10. E10: MRTO Created 
 Description: Due to widely recognized requirements gaps, the CG-
9333 PM provided funding to OSC for creation of a MASI 
requirements team (MRTO). The original planned duration was 9 
months. The requirements terminology from high level to low was 
“operational,” “functional,” and “system.” From the OSC point of 
view, the team was to identify MASI business processes and derive 
system requirements from the very high level ORD and FRD (yet to 
be delivered), and create requirements for WK/MASI 
interconnections. Normally, CG-761 and CG-741 would have 
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gathered end-user requirements and presented them to the MASI 
team. Capacity issues prevented this from being completed in a 
timely manner, a common HQ middle management problem. In 
addition, the OSC contractor responsible for staffing the MRTO 
team experienced difficulty hiring business analysts. The team was 
half-staffed for three months. 
 Event Type: Implicit 
 Implicit Category: Capacity 
 Severity: 5 
 Impact: Cost: $470k for a four person team over 9 months. Not part 
of the original IOC WK plan 
 Occurrence Time Frame: October 2010 
11. E11: EOC Mandated October 2011 MASI 2.0 Development 
Completion 
 Description: Referenced in E8, this was the most egregious 
requirement from the “EOC Getback” meeting (from the MASI point 
of view). The OSC MASI development team was asked for a MASI 
2.0 development estimate based on the high-level, vague 
requirements available. MASI 2.0 was to support WK IOP 
functionality and incorporate port partners. The MASI team 
estimate was 18 months. The EOC ignored the technical estimate 
and mandated a 12 month schedule with no funding increase (an 
arbitrary 6 month, 33 percent cut). The unrealistic deadline was 
designed to coincide with IOC WK Segment 2 SELC activities and 
milestone reviews, which were later delayed, though a 
corresponding MASI delay was not allowed until much later. The 
deadline was a great source of frustration to the MASI development 
team who were expected to commence development without 
system level requirements. To mitigate the capacity issue created 
by the restricted timeline, the idea of "baseline requirements" for 
MASI 2.0 were created. The OSC MASI project team invested 
significant time convincing middle management and senior leaders 
of the necessity of the scope reduction. Full implementation of IOP 
requirements (in as much as they existed) was not possible in the 
truncated time frame. 
 Event Type: Implicit 
 Implicit Category: Control 
 Severity: 8 
 Impact: Time/Scope: 33 percent compression of MASI 2.0 
development schedule forced eventual re-baseline of scope 
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 Occurrence Time Frame: October 2010 
12. E12: CG-633/CG-761/CG-741 MASI 1.1 Prioritization Decision 
 Description: Given the MASI 1.0 non-release after the deployment 
failure at Sector Seattle, CG-6 re-emphasized replacement of MHS-
Ops (originally scheduled for shutoff in Aug, 2010). The MASI team 
was forced to shift focus away from MASI 2.0 (for WK) in favor of 
the internal CG user. MASI 1.1 Development officially began Nov 3, 
2010 and ended Feb, 22, 2011 on schedule. A follow on minor 
update, MASI 1.1.1 was released in April. The MASI 1.1 effort was 
a resounding success, at the expense of MASI 2.0 development, 
the schedule for which had already been drastically shortened in 
E11. 
 Event Type: Implicit 
 Implicit Category: Control 
 Severity: 5 
 Impact: Time: Delayed MASI development team focus on MASI 2.0 
for WK by 4 months (25 percent of the 12-month truncated 
schedule from E11) 
 Occurrence Time Frame: November 2010 
13. E13: IOC FRD Published By CG-9333 Subcontractors. CG-9333 
Attempts to Control and Limit MASI Requirements Generation 
 Description: The IOC functional requirements document (FRD) was 
created by Booze Allen Hamilton (BAH) (contractor) in conjunction 
with CG-9333, with assistance from CG-741. The MRTO team had 
been told the document would enable direct decomposition of 
functional requirements into system requirements suitable for the 
MASI development team but this was not the case. The FRD 
contained critical gaps, but was vigorously defended by CG-9333 in 
an effort to maintain clan credibility. CG-761, CG-741, and MRTO 
were forced to prove the gaps in E22, experiencing significant 
delay. 
 Event Type: Implicit 
 Implicit Category: Control 
 Severity: 4 
 Impact: Time: Four month delay for the MRTO team as they were 
forced to significantly add to this document (E22) while dealing with 
significant CG-9333 resistance 
 Occurrence Time Frame: November 2010 
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14. E14: Power and Control Struggles Begin at Initial MRTO and 
Stakeholder (CG-9333, CG-761, CG-741, C3CEN, and OSC) 
Meeting 
 Description: CG-9333 had made several statements regarding 
control of the requirements process to the MRTO team prior to the 
joint kickoff meeting. CG-9333 and CG-761/CG-741 
representatives immediately clashed, and CG-761/CG-741 
departed the meeting after 15 minutes. The domineering attitude 
established by CG-9333 established the tone going forward. They 
insisted the FRD was sufficient to generate MASI system level 
requirements and attempted to directly control MRTO team 
activities. They were very sensitive to comments suggesting 
requirements were incomplete. 
 Event Type: Implicit 
 Implicit Category: Control 
 Severity: 6 
 Impact: Time/Scope: See E13 impact. In addition, developer time 
and CG personnel time was invested 
 Occurrence Time Frame: December 2010 
15. E15: AMT Non-Delivery by C3CEN 
 Description: The failure to deliver the Account Management Tool 
(AMT) by C3CEN was the first overt indication of capacity problems 
which impacted MASI. The MASI team required the AMT in order to 
design MASI functionality to authenticate and authorize WK port 
partner entry to the tool. After many delays, C3CEN delivered the 
AMT 10 months late without required functionality. The AMT delay 
was the result of CG-9333/C3CEN clan control, caused by capacity 
issues. CG-9333 was sensitive to schedule delays which continued 
to plague C3CEN, and did not prioritize the AMT on-schedule 
development because it was not perceived to be as visible as other 
delays. They prioritized C3CEN work to obfuscate capacity issues 
to senior leadership. Consideration of MASI was a secondary 
concern, because they saw MASI as a separate clan. This 
shortsighted outlook contributed significantly to delays in WK/MASI 
interconnection requirements and is an example of CG-9333 middle 
management latitude being utilized in a manner contrary to portfolio 
goals. When allowed by CG-9333, C3CEN and OSC development 
teams worked well together. After rearranging the development 
schedule several times, the MASI team was forced to design their 
half of the AMT interface based on what they guessed the WK AMT 
tool might do. 
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 Event Type: Implicit 
 Implicit Category: Capacity 
 Severity: 6 
 Impact: Time/Scope: The OSC MASI development schedule was 
re-written to delay development of MASI modules which required 
AMT. The eventual AMT delivery was unusable by MASI. Ensuing 
churn over the course of repeated non-delivery and associated 
meetings was 1 month 
 Occurrence Time Frame: January 2011 
16. E16: CG-9333 Provided Nine Months of MASI Funding for 2011 
Development 
 Description: The CG-9333 PM verbally agreed in July 2010 to fund 
9 months of 2011 MASI development (MASI 2.0) specifically to 
satisfy WK requirements. The PM stated at this time WK would 
have no further funds to supply for 2012. Funding from this source 
was not ideal because it further reinforced CG-9333 implicit control 
over MASI requirements and schedule. 
 Event Type: Explicit 
 Implicit Category: n/a 
 Severity: 4 
 Impact: Cost: CG-9333 directly and indirectly provided ~1.4M for 
OSC MASI 2.0 development in 2011. This cost was not part of the 
initial CG-9333 WK plan 
 Occurrence Time Frame: January 2011 
17. E17: MASI 1.1 Deployed, Users Happy. CG-761/CG-741/CG-633 
Delay Official Release 
 Description: As stated in E12 MASI 1.1 was a success. The 
Deployable Operations Group (DOG) was the primary user of MHS-
Ops, and they provided specific requirements to the MRTO and 
MASI development teams which were used to create the tool. 
Several in-progress demonstrations were held for DOG 
representatives, which were favorably received prior to final 
completion. Although DOG accepted the tool in March 2011, and 
began to use it, CG-761 did not authorize official production 
release. 
 Event Type: Explicit 
 Implicit Category: n/a 
 Severity: 8 
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 Impact: Time: Delayed development focus on MASI 2.0 for WK by 4 
months (25 percent of the 12-month truncated schedule from E11). 
(E12 and E17 bookend OSC MASI 1.1 development) 
 Occurrence Time Frame: March 2011 
18. E18: MASI 1.1 SDLC Documentation Incomplete 
 Description: MASI 1.1 was not officially released in March in large 
part because CG-633 did not complete the required SDLC 
documents. CG-633 middle management was experiencing 
significant capacity issues, and documentation was not prioritized. 
The documents were eventually created by July 2011 but by then 
CG-761/CG-741 had decided not to release MASI 1.1 beyond DOG 
use. Although the SDLC process was not properly followed by HQ, 
MASI 1.1 enabled the shutdown of MHS-Ops. 
 Event Type: Implicit 
 Implicit Category: Capacity 
 Severity: 5 
 Impact: Time/Quality: CG-633 delayed document completion for 4 
months 
 Occurrence Time Frame: March 2011 
19. E19: WK Does not Add Link to MASI 1.1 Contrary to EOC 
Mandate 
 Description: In March 2011, CG-761/CG-741 were supposed to 
allow C3CEN to place a link to MASI 1.1 on the WK tool bookmark 
page. This would have allowed CG WK users to use MASI 1.1. The 
CG-9333 PM requested this functionality as the initial link between 
WK and MASI (and was also mandated by E8), but CG-761/CG-
741 used the lack of SDLC documentation from CG-633 as a way 
to delay the request. Following completion of SDLC documents, 
CG-633 pushed for the link to be placed on WK, but after further 
delay CG-741 officially decided not to release MASI 1.1 for users 
other than the DOG. The primary reason for the decision was the 
ill-informed choice made in MASI 1.0 to tie the system to MISLE: A 
MASI user required a MISLE account for multiple units which was 
not practical. MASI 2.0 was to eliminate this requirement via the 
AMT and disconnection from the MISLE system. 
 Event Type: Implicit 
 Implicit Category: Control 
 Severity: 4 
 Impact: Time/Quality: MASI 1.1 link never added to WK 
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 Occurrence Time Frame: March 2011 
20. E20: MRTO Team Restricted by CG-9333 
 Description: The CG-9333 PM requested a BAH member to serve 
as a requirements subject matter expert and to help coordinate 
between C3CEN (WK) and OSC (MASI) as necessary. CG-9333 
felt data and business process gathering from CG Sectors was 
exhaustive. They felt any questions regarding process 
requirements could be answered by BAH or CG-9333. They placed 
extreme restrictions on MRTO interaction with end users. MRTO 
research relating to back-end system requirement gathering and 
definition were still deemed necessary (C3CEN, ALC/ALMIS, etc.) 
but controlled by CG-9333. CG-633, CG-761 and CG-741 were at 
odds with CG-9333 regarding their restrictions on requirements 
gathering. Although CG-9333 insisted the MRTO team interact only 
with them, they did not have answers for many questions. The 
MRTO effort was minimally tolerated by CG-9333 middle 
management, rather than embraced, delaying progress and 
minimizing MRTO effectiveness. 
 Event Type: Implicit 
 Implicit Category: Control 
 Severity: 5 
 Impact: Time: 4 month delay for MRTO team as they were forced to 
significantly add to the FRD (E13, E22) while dealing with 
significant CG-9333 resistance which caused further delay of 2 
months, additively over time) 
 Occurrence Time Frame: 2011 
21. E21: CG-761/CG-741 Do not Approve MASI 2.0 Functional 
Requirements 
 Description: The deadline mandated in E11 required reducing the 
scope of MASI 2.0 (see Figure 4: Project Management Triangle). 
CG-761/CG-741 middle management agreed to provide high level 
MASI 2.0 baseline requirements in March 2011, for MRTO to focus 
on decomposing to system level requirements. CG-761/CG-741 did 
not deliver. The high level MASI 2.0 subset of requirements was not 
approved until May (more than two months later) following a 
proposal of the requirements from OSC. The reluctance of CG-
761/CG-741 to formally approve functional and system level 
requirements would plague the project until its termination. This 
was a reflection of capacity issues at CG-7, implicit control 
difficulties with CG-9333 middle management, and gaps in the IOC 
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ORD and FRD. Put simply, the business processes which BAH 
claimed to have mapped, were incomplete. 
 Event Type: Implicit 
 Implicit Category: Capacity 
 Severity: 4 
 Impact: Scope/Quality 
 Occurrence Time Frame: March 2011 
22. E22: Conflict Over FRD 1.1 Content Between CG-7 and CG-9333 
Further Delays Creation of System Level Requirements 
 Description: Dysfunction between HQ middle management 
continued when incorporating MRTO feedback into the CG-9333 
FRD. MRTO, CG-761, and CG-741 stated the FRD contained too 
many gaps to allow decomposition to MASI system level 
requirements. CG-9333 disagreed stating the FRD was complete. 
This forced MRTO to spend nearly 4 months mapping out gaps, 
rather than decomposing the FRD. CG-9333 finally admitted the 
gaps when MRTO identified 75 new Functional Requirements for a 
163 percent increase in IOC Interagency Operational Planning 
(IOP) requirements. New functionality included replacement of the 
security model, a binary attachment service, and implementation of 
claims based modeling. 
 Event Type: Implicit 
 Implicit Category: Control 
 Severity: 5 
 Impact: Time: 4 month delay for MRTO (see E13, E20) while 
dealing with significant CG-9333 resistance. Also caused OSC 
MASI development churn 
 Occurrence Time Frame: April 2011 
23. E23: C4IT-SC Brief: WK/MASI Concerns 
 Description: During this briefing, senior leadership was officially 
informed of:  
1. IOC FRD gaps causing significant delays in decomposing functional 
requirements.  
2. Lack of OSC and C3CEN meetings to define MASI integration with 
WatchKeeper due to lack of CG-9333 middle management 
prioritization of C3CEN resources. C3CEN participation was required 
by OSC to co-develop the integration solution.  
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3. CG-6/CG-7 were failing to engage other enterprise systems (ALMIS, 
MISLE, AOPS) to arrange data transfer mechanisms between 
systems.  
No meaningful action was taken by senior leaders following this brief. 
The first issue was a result of CG-9333 middle management implicit 
control. The second revolved around C3CEN capacity issues, and the 
third involved middle management capacity issues at CG-6/CG-7. CG-
6/CG-7 capacity issues were creating episodes of firefighting, and they 
incorrectly perceived system interconnect issues as non-critical at that 
time. They failed to understand the significant lead time and high-level 
authorization necessary to place MASI related work in the 
development schedule of several other enterprise systems. 
 Event Type: Implicit 
 Implicit Category: Control 
 Severity: 3 
 Impact: Time/Scope: Briefing on impacts from E13, E20, E22, and 
warning of future scope issues 
 Occurrence Time Frame: April 2011 
24. E24: 2012 MASI Funding in Doubt 
 Description: CG-9333 had stated in the middle of 2010 it would be 
unable to provide any MASI funding past 2011. Rather than 
focusing effort on locating alternate funding sources for 2012, CG-
6/CG-7 middle management engaged the MASI team in creation of 
a myriad of budget projections, based on several different 2012 
scenarios. Several scenarios involved cutting team personnel and 
reducing the scope of MASI. In defense of CG-6/CG-7 middle 
management, there seemed to be only token support from their 
superiors who simply ordered them to find solutions. As time 
progressed, the uncertainty of the program's future impacted MASI 
planning, team morale, and CG-9333 confidence in an eventual 
MASI system. 
 Event Type: Implicit 
 Implicit Category: Funding Priority 
 Severity: 7 
 Impact: Cost/Scope: Only ~28 percent of OSC MASI 2012 funding 
had been identified. Extensive scope and personnel (cost) 
reductions were discussed 
 Occurrence Time Frame: April 2011 
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25. E25: WK does not Utilize MASI 1.2 for WK State of the Port (SOP) 
Contrary to EOC Mandate  
 Description: E8 and E23 show examples of senior leadership 
awareness of the lack of interoperability between WK and MASI 
due to lack of prioritization. As mentioned, CG-9333 middle 
management did not prioritize the capacity-limited C3CEN 
development teams to perform WK development related to MASI. 
The failure of the WK State of the Port (SOP) display to incorporate 
the MASI 1.2 ESB data feed was another example. Senior leaders 
had mandated WK use of MASI 1.1 and 1.2 in E8. The lack of the 
MASI 1.1 link on WK was detailed in E19. The MASI team designed 
1.2 on schedule and waited for C3CEN to complete their SOP to 
enable testing of the data service. C3CEN moved implementation 
from June 2011, to Feb, 2012 (8 months). In November 2011, CG-
741 officially decided not to deploy MASI 1.2 until MASI 2.0 went to 
production. The continual delays, lack of senior leadership support, 
and disregard by CG-9333 for the OSC team caused MASI 
schedule churn and morale issues. 
 Event Type: Implicit 
 Implicit Category: Capacity 
 Severity: 4 
 Impact: Cost/Time: $100k estimated OSC MASI development 
resource wasted. Also caused MASI schedule churn which later 
wasted another month for 1 developer. MASI 1.2 was never utilized 
by WK 
 Occurrence Time Frame: June 2011 
26. E26: Change of CG-9333 PM 
 Description: The outgoing CG-9333 PM was responsible for funding 
MRTO, and 9 months of MASI 2011 development, as well as the 
initial decision to use MASI for WK IOP functionality. Although 
senior leadership (including the PM) in general disregarded MASI 
issues, the PM supported MASI integration under WK. As an effort 
to ensure WK/MASI integration following his departure, the PM 
wrote an official memo detailing high level MASI 2.0 requirements. 
Following his departure, however, the inexperienced incoming PM 
was overly susceptible to mid-level CG-9333 management input. 
The CG-9333 middle managers had firmly established their clan 
mentality with an ongoing lack of prioritization for WK/MASI 
interconnection issues, and restriction and delay of the MRTO 
mission. Their attitude was transmitted to the new PM who seemed 
to view MASI as a necessary impediment. 
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 Event Type: Implicit 
 Implicit Category: Control 
 Severity: 5 
 Impact: Loss of CG-9333 senior level champion of the OSC MASI 
team 
 Occurrence Time Frame: June 2011 
27. E27: MASI Development Team Begins RAD/JAD Methodology 
Description: CG-9333 interference in MRTO system requirements 
generation and the delays caused by resolution of FRD gaps resulted 
in the OSC development team "catching up" to requirements 
generation. The team had been designing infrastructure and back end 
services based on lessons learned from MASI 1.0, but had reached 
the point where further development could no longer proceed without 
new system requirements. The prior pseudo-waterfall method was 
discontinued in favor of the RAD/JAD agile development approach, 
which focused on defining system level requirements with developer 
input, immediately before official coding of each MASI module. The 
effort was also designed to assist the capacity constrained CG-
761/CG-741/CG-633 middle management representatives by 
incorporating their feedback during the JADs. CG-761/CG-741 were 
responsible for representing users by delivering requirements. MRTO 
members transcribed requirements created during JADs, but obtaining 
timely approval of these requirements by middle managers remained 
a critical problem and source of delays. 
 Event Type: Implicit 
 Implicit Category: Control 
 Severity: 4 
 Impact: Time/Scope: New methodology to enable near-concurrent 
requirements definition and system development 
 Occurrence Time Frame: July 2011 
28. E28: Status Brief to Assistant Commandant for U.S. Coast Guard 
Capability (CG-7 RDML) 
 Description: Another brief to senior leadership which focused on 
issues involving MASI development. By this time, senior leadership 
was accustomed to "MASI problems,” but the OSC MASI team was 
rarely the cause of these issues. Although successfully deployed to 
the DOG, the official MASI 1.1 deployment decision still resided 
with middle management at CG-761/CG-741. MASI 1.2 deployment 
(completed by OSC) awaited C3CEN implementation of the WK 
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portion. MASI 2.0 development (already on an unrealistic schedule) 
was delayed by resolution of FRD gaps, interference through both 
CG-9333 action and non-action, and non-delivery of the AMT by 
C3CEN. The series of shocks to the MASI schedule and team from 
WK and CG-9333 were visibly affecting the MASI effort. Lack of 
interoperability requirements between WK and MASI were again 
highlighted, as well as lack of identification of 2012 MASI funds. 
MASI 2.0 delivery in October was at risk. Once again, senior 
leadership made only token gestures at resolution of issues. 
 Event Type: Implicit 
 Implicit Category: Control 
 Severity: 3 
 Impact: Time/Cost/Scope: Briefed on impacts from E11-E15, E17-
E25, and E27 
 Occurrence Time Frame: July 2011 
 
 
29. E29: MRTO Staffing Issues/MRTO Extension 
 Description: Delays in requirements generation prompted MRTO 
team extension to end of 2011 and slippage of deliverables. Initial 
staffing difficulties and departure of an analyst allowed the 
extension to the remaining team under the original funding amount. 
 Event Type: Implicit 
 Implicit Category: Capacity 
 Severity: 3 
 Impact: Time: 6 Month MRTO team extension (see E13, E20, E22) 
 Occurrence Time Frame: July 2011 
30. E30: CG-9333 Pushes for Fundamental Changes in WK/MASI 
Interconnection (Object Level Linkage) 
 Description: The original CG-9333 PM (who departed in E26) had 
mandated all WK/MASI intersystem connectivity take place via ESB 
in support of CG policy and given WK technical limitations. CG-
9333 middle management finally realized this limitation would 
impact desired WK user performance. No solution was readily 
available because interoperability concerns had been repeatedly 
delayed due to C3CEN capacity issues and lack of CG-9333 
  119 
prioritization. Clan mentality continued to dominate CG-9333 and 
reinforced their perception of MASI as a liability. 
 Event Type: Implicit 
 Implicit Category: Control 
 Severity: 6 
 Impact: Scope 
 Occurrence Time Frame: July 2011 
31. E31: MASI 2.0 Non-delivery to WK for Integration 
 Description: Delivery of MASI 2.0 in October of 2011 was an 
artificial deadline created by senior management (E8, E11) when 
only rudimentary business requirements had been defined. Given 
no extra resources and a reduced timeline, the MASI team was 
forced to re-define MASI 2.0 functionality (project management 
triangle). The delays and issues detailed in E12-E26, and E28-E30 
compounded and built upon one another to infect MASI 
development and made delivery in October impossible. C3CEN had 
not completed the AMT tool to enable critical MASI development. 
System requirements were still incomplete in October. By June 
2011, WK had delayed planned MASI 2.0 integration until April 
2012, yet a corresponding MASI development schedule slip was 
denied. Although senior leadership had been briefed on the serious 
issues facing MASI development which were beyond the authority 
of the MASI team to control, they did not meaningfully intervene. 
The unjust perception of MASI as a problem project was magnified 
by this event, although it should have surprised no one. MASI team 
morale continued to degrade and team members began to resign. 
 Event Type: Implicit 
 Implicit Category: Control 
 Severity: 7 
 Impact: Time/Cost: Total OSC MASI development cost from 
inception to this date was roughly $5.8M. The only system fielded 
at this time was MASI 1.1, used by CG DOG. WK had not created 
the AMT, or integrated MASI 1.1 or 1.2, and 2.0 was not delivered 
(for reasons described in E11-E15, E20-E23, and E28-E30) 
 Occurrence Time Frame: October 2011 
32. E32: CG-9333 Directs WK/MASI Technical Interface Meetings be 
Delayed Until December 2012 
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 Description: Although many MASI issues were directly and 
indirectly influenced by CG-9333 middle management decisions, 
non-delivery of MASI 2.0 was interpreted by the CG-9333 PM as 
OSC MASI development team unreliability. He began to influence 
CG-741 senior leadership with this view. WK (C3CEN) was once 
again late with a service pack delivery (capacity) and CG-9333, 
operating on clan control assumptions and engaging in firefighting, 
further delayed meetings between OSC and C3CEN which would 
define system touchpoints and interoperability. The AMT and port 
partner requirements were further delayed, which in turn delayed 
MASI development of corresponding modules. The CG-9333 PM 
did not view C3CEN work as superior to that of OSC (given their 
repeated delays) but he viewed WK as part of his clan and 
prioritized for them. The WK program had been investigated by the 
GAO and downgraded from major acquisition status due to 
sustained capacity and development issues at C3CEN, in large part 
caused by lack of useable WK requirements from BAH. The 
downgrade removed further SELC milestone requirements, but 
impacted WK funding. 
 Event Type: Implicit 
 Implicit Category: Capacity 
 Severity: 5 
 Impact: Time/Scope: WK/MASI interconnection definitions and AMT 
requirements delayed another 6 weeks. Caused further churn to the 
OSC MASI 2.0 development schedule 
 Occurrence Time Frame: October 2011 
33. E33: Competition for 2012 Funds Between WK and MASI 
 Description: The only funds identified by CG-633/CG-761 middle 
management for MASI were also claimed by CG-9333 for WK. 
Global budget cuts and a C4IT-SC fee levied on programs, 
combined with the lack of funding emphasis by HQ middle 
management (despite continued warnings from the MASI team 
which had begun 7 months prior) made the issue critical. The CG-
9333 WK acquisition was mandated by congress, and they were 
certain they would receive the money. For reasons not known to 
the author, the CG-761 directorate head was certain the funds 
would go to MASI. Also for unknown reasons, CG-761 middle 
management broke away from the directive of their superior and 
influenced the final decision to allocate funds to WK. The true error 
was in allowing competition for funds between codependent 
programs. CG-9333 began to quietly investigate alternatives to 
MASI. 
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 Event Type: Implicit 
 Implicit Category: Funding Priority 
 Severity: 9 
 Impact: Cost: CG-633/CG-761 on behalf of OSC MASI, and CG-
9333 on behalf of C3CEN WK both tried to obtain the same $1.3M 
for 2012 
 Occurrence Time Frame: September 2011-January 2012 
34. E34: MASI Status Brief to RDML (CG-7) and SES (CG-6) 
 Description: From the senior leadership perspective, this brief again 
focused on MASI development and release problems. The official 
decision not to place MASI 1.1 into production (beyond DOG use) 
was announced (middle management decision),the decision not to 
deploy MASI 1.2 until MASI 2.0 rolled was announced, as well as 
failure to complete development on MASI 2.0. The toll on the MASI 
development team had become critical as they announced a 2 
month overall delay due to loss of the senior database designer 
and a critical middleware developer. The middleware developer 
was not replaced due to 2012 funding uncertainty. The opinion of 
senior leadership (with the exception of the CG-761 director) 
continued to turn against MASI as a viable option, particularly that 
of the CG-9333 PM. 
 Event Type: Implicit 
 Implicit Category: Capacity 
 Severity: 5 
 Impact: Cost/Time/Scope: Briefed events to this point. OSC MASI 
announced an additional 2 month delay due to attrition of critical 
team members 
 Occurrence Time Frame: November 2011 
35. E35: CG-9333, CG-741, and CG-761 Hold "Simple Scheduler" 
Meetings Without Notifying OSC 
 Description: The CG-9333 PM directed his middle management to 
create an approach that would allow them to officially separate from 
MASI if given RDML approval. CG-741 and CG-761 middle 
management assisted. CG-633 and OSC were not informed. This 
was motivated not only by loss of confidence in MASI, but also 
heavily influenced by E30 and continued CG-9333/CG-741 
reluctance to implement MASI solutions, or to define 
interconnection requirements. They created the concept of a 
"simple scheduler" which would run natively under WK (solving 
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E30), with minimal automated functionality. Many WK IOP actions 
would be performed manually by IOC personnel to satisfy high-level 
congressional requirements. CG-9333 planned for the perennially 
resource constrained developers at C3CEN to implement the 
"Simple Scheduler" (although C3CEN would no longer be required 
to interact with MASI) illustrating a reciprocal effect where 
continued neglect of MASI caused additional work for WK. C3CEN 
at the developer level is not believed to have been initially aware of 
this because they were later forced to create a “level of effort” for 
the undertaking. 
 Event Type: Implicit 
 Implicit Category: Control 
 Severity: 6 
 Impact: Time/Scope: An increase in C3CEN WK time (est. 3-4 
months) and change to scope, in an attempt to remove 
dependence on MASI 
 Occurrence Time Frame: 
36. E36: MASI 2.0 Demonstration to Senior Stakeholders/Funding 
Pitch 
 Description: The OSC MASI team and OSC leadership believed 
MASI development would be canceled. The MASI technical lead 
and the author presented a MASI functional demonstration at HQ to 
several key stakeholders, including O-6s from CG-741, CG-9333, 
CG-761, CG-633, and OSC in an effort to save the program. The 
demonstration focused on the extensive MASI 2.0 functionality 
already completed at that time. All attendees were impressed (The 
CG-761 directorate head labelled the result "visionary,” and "the 
future of the CG"), but unfortunately no source of MASI funding for 
2012 was identified. CG-741 verified that even if MASI funding 
were found, the MASI team would not develop the “simple 
scheduler” as defined, but would revert to prior MASI 2.0 
requirements, which were still incomplete. The remaining 
motivation for MASI development was enterprise CG use beyond 
the DOG. 
 Event Type: Implicit 
 Implicit Category: Funding Priority 
 Severity: 7 
 Impact: None beyond support of CG-761. An attempt to 
demonstrate the value of MASI development to date, and the 
potential presented by the system 
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 Occurrence Time Frame: January 2012 
37. E37: RDML CG-7 Memo: MASI No Longer to Provide Any 
Functionality for WK 
 Description: This official memo allowed WK to develop the "Simple 
Scheduler" and voided MASI as the system to complete WK IOP 
requirements. The RDML noted insufficient funds, lack of 
requirements, and loss of WK segment 2 as factors (a combination 
of E6. and WK downgrade). 
 Event Type: Explicit 
 Implicit Category: n/a 
 Severity: 8 
 Impact: Cost/Time: CG-9333 wasted an estimated $4M-$5M by 
eliminating MASI from eventual use in WK, and added 3-4 months 
of development effort to C3CEN WK for the Simple Scheduler 
 Occurrence Time Frame: January 2012 
38. E38: CG-761 Provides $200k Interim MASI Funding 
 Description: Extensive budget meetings were held with the C4IT-
SC in an attempt to identify MASI 2012 funding. A full year 
commitment was not forthcoming but CG-761 pledged to send an 
FTA of $200k to OSC to keep the development team in place until 
the end of February. At that time a final funding decision was to be 
made. Even at that point, in the face of all opposition, the CG-761 
directorate head believed the program would continue. He stated:  
I am tired of discussing getting an RP for MASI. I expect the C4ISR 
RC to use our working capital fund to develop MASI and eliminate 
AOPS/TMT and ALMIS/EAL. This is not a secret. I expect all to 
follow my direction AND EXECUTE THE DIRECTION. (Personal 
communication, January 25, 2012) 
Despite this directive, CG-761 middle management continued to 
undercut MASI and recommend cessation of development. 
 Event Type: Implicit 
 Implicit Category: Funding Priority 
 Severity: 3 
 Impact: Cost: $200k 
 Occurrence Time Frame: January 2012 
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39. E39: Loss of 55 Percent of MASI Team Over Four Months, 
Including Technical Lead and Senior Developer 
 Description: Morale on the OSC MASI development team had 
continued to degrade due to the compounding events involving CG-
9333, WK, and HQ middle management. The contagion had 
reached a critical point. The message was continually delivered, 
directly and indirectly, that MASI was not worthy of prioritization. 
From October 2011, to February 2012, 55 percent of the OSC 
MASI development team resigned. Loss of the team technical 
leader was the final blow from which development could not 
recover on any practical timeline. At this time the author 
recommended cessation of development and maintenance of MASI 
1.1 for DOG use (which continues to the date of this writing). 
 Event Type: Implicit 
 Implicit Category: Capacity 
 Severity: 8 
 Impact: Time: Undefined delay, minimum 5 months, to allow 
rebuilding and training of new OSC MASI team (was not attempted) 
 Occurrence Time Frame: October 2011-February 2012 
40. E40: Course of Action (COA) EOC Meeting 
 Description: The official meeting where MASI development was 
indefinitely halted. Operations and maintenance funding was used 
to sustain MASI 1.1 operation for the CG DOG users. 
 Event Type: Implicit 
 Implicit Category: Capacity 
 Severity: 10 
 Impact: Cost: As noted in E3, ~$6.5M+$470k (MRTO). MASI 1.1 
development was a modest ~$650k and was the only version 
released for use (CG DOG) 
 Occurrence Time Frame: February 2012 
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APPENDIX B. MASI 1.1 TO 2.0 ARCHITECTURAL CHANGES 
MASI 1.1 Architecture 
MASI 1.1 consists of a single user interface that bridges data from two back-end 
information systems. The user interface is built in Silverlight 3.0. It communicates via 
traditional SOAP communications to a WCF data service (web service). The data service 
coordinates calls to two SQL Server persistent data stores (MASI and MISLE) to fulfill 
data requirements. 
  
All users of MASI 1.1 are members of the Coast Guard Active Directory deployment. 
User authentication is handled via traditional authentication methodologies in a single-
sign on scenario (Kerberos and NTLM). In addition, all users are accessing the application 
via the CGDN only. No DMZ access is currently available. 
  
To facilitate MASI 1.1 capabilities, we addressed the following key components: 
1. Users and the security model for the application. 
2. Coast Guard hierarchy. 
3. Coast Guard Resources. 
4. Appointments. 
  
Users and the security model for the application 
In 1.1, MASI has strict relationships with user account management processes in 
MISLE. The model is based on explicit approvals for a user-to-Coast-Guard-unit 
inside the MISLE database. Direct calls from MASI to MISLE are utilized to validate 
what units a given user has authority to access when the user logs into the MASI 
application. 
  
Coast Guard Unit Hierarchy 
MASI 1.1 uses data stored in MISLE to generate a hierarchical representation of 
units. Data used includes the MISLE unit table coupled with the AOPS unit 
reference data which contains a recursive relationship to drive parent-child 
hierarchy. 
  
Coast Guard Resources 
MASI 1.1 uses data stored in MISLE to generate resource listings for each unit. 
These resources include AOPS and ALMIS reference data representing resources 
from those systems, in addition to MISLE local resource data. 
  
Appointments 
The data pertaining to the scheduling of resources (units and physical assets) is 
housed in the MASI data store. 
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MASI 2.0 Scope & Architecture 
Some of the MASI 2.0 requirements drove goals like decoupling from MISLE, obtaining 
information directly from systems of records, addressing port partner capabilities 
(including existing user identity stores), expansion of the application presence to a new 
security domain (DMZ), and publishing of data after modifications to other systems. 
MASI 2.0 was a fundamental architectural redesign.  
  
Architectural goals included utilizing the Coast Guard's Enterprise Service Bus to obtain 
the information necessary to fulfill system requirements by establishing data feeds from 
the Coast Guard IT systems designated as "systems of record.” Also, due to the 
introduction of a new security zone (DMZ) and users from a disparate identity store, a 
solution had to be addressed to facilitate user authentication and authorization. This 
solution also came into play when accessing data inside the Coast Guard Data Network. 
Some of the data presented back to the client needed to be filtered, masked, or in some 
cases, not even sent back to the consuming user interfaces. 
  
To facilitate MASI 2.0 capabilities, we addressed the following key components: 
1. Identify solution for user authentication/authorization in multiple security 
zones. 
2. Identify data sources necessary to fulfill decoupling (hierarchy & resources). 
a. Establish tools for ESB/SOA interaction 
b. Establish data feeds with necessary systems of record. 
3. Identify solution for the data tier to support data masking, filtering, or 
omission based on user permissions. 
4. Implement new requirements for port partner capabilities. 
a. Account management 
b. Ability to create/manage port partner organizations & resources. 
c. Integration with Coast Guard capabilities. 




Our immediate goals focused on addressing an interoperable solution for solving 
user authentication/authorization in a solution based on multiple security 
domains. To address this, we externalized these capabilities to a security token 
service and built in application trusts to these capabilities. Authentication and 
authorization data was passed using industry standard xml-based SAML tokens. 
  
These tokens allow for interoperability between C3CEN WatchKeeper capabilities, 
Juniper device, MASI user interface, and MASI data services. 
  
Establish tools for ESB/SOA interaction 
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Tooling was developed to work with the Coast Guard ESB to facilitate the sending 
and receiving of data necessary to fulfill decoupling from MISLE. 
  
Establish data feeds with necessary systems of record 
Extensive work has been performed from the PSOA, MISLE, MASI, ALMIS, and 
AOPS teams to fulfill MASI 2.0 data requirements. 
  
Identify solution for the data tier to support data masking, filtering, or omission 
based on user permissions 
MASI 2.0 data services have been re-engineered to take advantage of the WS-* 
specification. Utilizing WS-Federation, we are able to apply logic decisions on data 
calls that can impact what data is returned to the clients.  
  
Implement new requirements for port partner capabilities 
Additions were made to SQL Server to facilitate requirements additions to support 
port partner capabilities. The data services were extended to support a hierarchy 
of Coast Guard departments and port partner organizations. 
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APPENDIX C. MASI TEAM OF THE QUARTER AWARD (MASI 
1.1) 
The Operational Systems Center’s (OSC) Mission and Asset Scheduling 
Interface Team is cited for superior performance and outstanding teamwork 
during this period, specifically the successful development and release of a major 
system upgrade. 
MASI is a web enabled tool to support operational planning and current 
asset status, providing a means to capture planned and executed operations for 
USCG and port partners as required by the Security and Accountability for Every 
(SAFE) Port Act.  
Timely requirements definition and superlative work by the development 
team, while adhering to a very tight schedule, enabled the successful release of 
a major update to the MASI system. The system update incorporates extensive 
new functionality and performance enhancements: redundant data transfer was 
reduced by 73 percent, data payload size by 65 percent, and the returned 
payload was compressed by 33 percent. The release enabled CG use of MASI 5 
months sooner than the originally projected solution and allowed termination of 
the non-enterprise MHS-OPS program. Quality of design and ease of use 
allowed quick adoption of the tool by the entire CG Deployable Operations Group 
(DOG) and 27 subunits, as well as facilitating area and district users. To date, 
DOG users have created over 1400 Missions. The PACAREA Chief of Response 
(PAC-33) conveyed his satisfaction and lauded MASI as a “great success story 
of collaboration.” In the same release, the team also completed development 
work on a Tasked Asset data service for IOC WatchKeeper to support maritime 
awareness for the USCG, DHS and DOD Port Partners. Close coordination 
between C3CEN and the team enabled the data service delivery 5 weeks before 
required date. 
Also during this period, extensive work was completed on the next major 
release which will enable direct nationwide port partner access and participation 
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in the MASI IOC/WatchKeeper scheduling process. The team bridged gaps 
between HQ program sponsors, CG-9333 and fellow Centers of Excellence 
(COEs) while identifying 75 new Functional Requirements for a 163 percent 
increase in IOC Interagency Operational Planning (IOP) requirements. New 
functionality included replacement of the security model, a binary attachment 
service, and implementation of claims based modeling. Superior teamwork was 
demonstrated in collaboration with Emerging Technologies (ET) in the 
establishment of a baseline .NET enterprise ESB client and security token 
service capabilities as an enterprise solution for authentication and authorization. 
Subsequent release will promote interagency asset utilization and mission 
coordination, projected to save millions of dollars each year. 
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